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ATTEMPT, RECKLESS HOMICIDE, AND
THE DESIGN OF CRIMINAL LAW
MICHAEL

T. CAHILL*

Most American criminal codes create an offense for recklessly killing another person, and nearly all contain a general provision covering any attempt to commit an offense.
This article explores the relation between reckless homicide
and attempt, which proves more complex than it appears
and also turns out to provide a useful startingpoint for examination of several broader issues in attempt law and
criminal law generally.
The idea of "attempted reckless homicide" ("ARH") is
largely disfavored by legal scholars and almost, but not
quite, universally rejected in American law. Part I of the article questions that hostility. The theoretical arguments
against ARH prove unpersuasive, or else too persuasive, in
that taking them seriously would call into doubt not only
ARH but also the general notion of having attempt liability
at all. Moreover, the legal case against ARH under existing
criminal statutes is by no means airtight. Indeed, the widely
followed Model Penal Code formulation of attempt, read according to its own commentary's interpretiveguidance, actually allows ARH in a limited set of situations, though the
Code elsewhere tries to deny the possibility of ARH.
Although the law has not embraced ARH per se, it does
penalize the same (or very nearly the same) conduct ARH
would address, by creating a distinct offense of reckless 'endangerment, or a variety of more particularoffenses covering
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specific forms of dangerous conduct, or (commonly) both.
Yet as Part II of the article discusses, the endangermentoffense "solution"to the ARH puzzle creates its own practical
problems and raises a distinct set of questions about how to
formulate criminal law rules. The idea of writing a single
attempt provision expansively covering any conduct that
risks, but does not create, a criminal harm seems rooted in a
sense that criminal law works best by establishingrelatively
few general rules of broad application. By contrast, the project of identifying particular types of risky conduct and
criminalizing each with a specific offense indicates a sense
that criminal rules should be narrow and precise, rather
than broad and flexible.
The article explores these two visions of how to write
criminal law-which I call the thin-code and thick-code
models, respectively-and describes how the choice between
thick and thin is not merely formal, but may have significant practical consequences. Although each model has its
independent merits, indiscriminately mixing the two is likely
to make for a poor and problematic criminal code. Sadly,
though, such thoughtless blends of thin and thick are all too
common in our criminal law; if anything, they seem to be increasing.
INTRODUCTION
Most American criminal codes provide for an offense of
reckless homicide, also commonly known as involuntary manslaughter.1 The offense is committed when one "recklessly"

1. Twenty-nine states explicitly define an offense that prohibits recklessly
causing the death of another person. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-3(a) (LexisNexis
2005); ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.120(a)(1) (2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
13-1103(A)(1) (2001 & Supp. 2006); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-104(a)(3) (2006);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-104(1)(a) (2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-55(a)(1)
(West 2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 632(1) (2001); HAW. REV. STAT. §
707-702(a)(1) (1993 & Supp. 2005); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-3 (West 2002);
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-5 (LexisNexis 2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3404(a)
(1995 & Supp. 2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.040(1) (LexisNexis 1999) (defining offense as "wantonly" killing another. 'Wantonly," as defined supra §
501.020(3), is equivalent to standard definition of recklessness); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17-A, § 203 (2006); MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.024 (West 2000); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 630:2(I)(b) (1996 & Supp. 2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-4(b)(1)
(West 2005); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.15(1) (McKinney 2004 & Supp. 2007); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-02 (1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.041 (West 2006);

OR. REV. STAT. § 163.125(a) (2005); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2504 (West 1998 &
Supp. 2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-60 (2003) (requiring "criminal negligence,"
but defining that term as a "reckless disregard of the safety of others"); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-20 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-215 (2006); TEX.
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causes another person's death-in other words, to use the most
common formulation, when one causes a death while "consciously disregard[ing] a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
PENAL CODE § 19.04 (Vernon 2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-205 (2003); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.060 (West 2000); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.06 (2005); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 6-2-105(a)(ii) (2006).
Another seven states, and the District of Columbia, criminalize "manslaughter" (or, in two cases, "involuntary manslaughter") without defining the term. See
D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-2105 (2001 & Supp. 2006); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §
2-207(a) (LexisNexis 2002); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 13 (LexisNexis 2002 &
Supp. 2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.321 (West 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
14-18 (2005 & Supp. 2006) (distinguishing voluntary and involuntary manslaughter); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-3 (2002 & Supp. 2006) (manslaughter); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, § 2304 (1998 & Supp. 2006); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-5 (LexisNexis
2005). The standard understanding of manslaughter would include reckless
homicide as involuntary manslaughter. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL
LAW § 15.4, at 794-96 (4th ed. 2003) (discussing common-law view of involuntary
manslaughter as requiring some form of gross "negligence," often better characterized as "recklessness" under modern terminology, and noting that the "modern
view" is to require recklessness).
Nine states, and the federal criminal code, do not have an offense for reckless
homicide specifically, but either have an offense for negligent homicide (which
presumably would also include reckless homicides) or define "manslaughter" or
"involuntary manslaughter" in a way that seems to suggest a standard of negligence rather than recklessness. See 18 U.S.C. § 1112 (2000); CAL. PENAL CODE §
192(b) (West 1999 & Supp. 2007); FLA.STAT. ANN. ch. 782.07(1) (2000); GA.CODE
ANN. § 16-5-3(a),(b) (2004); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4006(2) (2004); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 707.5 (West 2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:32 (1997 & Supp. 2007);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-104 (2005) (negligent homicide; § 45-2-101(42) defines
"negligence" to include standard conceptions of both recklessness and negligence);
OKLA.STAT. tit. 21, §716 (2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-36 (2004) (referring only to
"involuntary manslaughter," but aggravating punishment for that offense in §
18.2-36.1(B) if conduct shows "reckless disregard for human life," indicating base
offense requires something less). In Minnesota, one version of "manslaughter"
refers to both "negligence" and consciousness of a risk, suggesting something
closer to recklessness, except that the consciousness need not involve a risk of
death specifically. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.205(1) (West 2003) (causing death
by "culpable negligence whereby the person creates an unreasonable risk, and
consciously takes chances of causing death or great bodily harm to another").
Finally, four states have homicide provisions whose closest approximations to
reckless homicide do not clearly fit into any of the above three categories. See
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-35 (2006) (defining manslaughter to cover killings "without malice, in the heat of passion, but in a cruel or unusual manner, or by use of a
dangerous weapon"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-305 (1995 & Supp. 2005) (defining
manslaughter to require an "unlawful act"), id. § 28-306 (defining offense of "motor vehicle homicide," satisfied by any death resulting from a violation of driving
laws); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.070 (LexisNexis 2006) (defining involuntary
manslaughter to cover deaths resulting from commission of a "lawful act which
probably might produce such a consequence in an unlawful manner"); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 30-2-3 (2004) (defining manslaughter as "the unlawful killing of a human
being without malice," and defining involuntary manslaughter to include manslaughter resulting from the "commission of a lawful act which might produce
death in an unlawful manner or without due caution and circumspection").
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[the death] will result from [one's] conduct."2 Nearly all codes
also have a general provision prohibiting any "attempt" to
commit an offense.3 This article examines how, if at all, those
two provisions relate to each other. Is there such an offense as
"attempted reckless homicide" (which, to save space, I will call
"ARH"), or should there be one? If not, why not? As it turns
out, ARH proves to be a fairly tricky puzzle whose solution(s)
can offer interesting insights into the nature and proper design
of attempt law, and of criminal law as a whole.
Past treatments of the possibility of ARH have generally
been, to put it charitably, unenthusiastic about the concept,
ranging from a qualified and seemingly reluctant acknowledgment of its possibility to a clear and emphatic rejection of the
very idea as absurd. In nearly all jurisdictions to consider the
question, courts have held that no such offense exists.4 The offense has been explicitly recognized, however, in one state:
Colorado.5 Commentators' views have been somewhat more
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1985); see also id. cmt. 3 at 238-39
2.
nn.18-19 (citing numerous state statutes and cases adopting this formulation of
recklessness).
3.
For a discussion of (and citations to) these provisions, see infra Part I.D.
4.
See, e.g., State v. Holbron, 904 P.2d 912, 920, 930 (Haw. 1995) ("Our research efforts have failed to discover a single jurisdiction that has recognized the
possibility of attempted involuntary manslaughter. On the other hand, the cases
holding that attempted involuntary manslaughter is a statutory impossibility are
legion.... We agree with the rest of the Anglo-American jurisprudential world
that there can be no attempt to commit involuntary manslaughter.") (internal
quotation marks omitted). See also State v. Almeda, 455 A.2d 1326 (Conn. 1983);
State v. Jones, 21 P.3d 569, 571 (Kan. 2001); Bailey v. State, 688 P.2d 320 (Nev.
1984); State v. Kimbrough, 924 S.W.2d 888, 891 (Tenn. 1996) (rejecting ARH and
citing cases in agreement from Alabama, Nebraska, Oregon, and Utah); State v.
George, 527 N.W.2d 638, 642 (Neb. Ct. App. 1995); People v. Johnson, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 798, 801 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). Cf. State v. Grant, 418 A.2d 154 (Me.
1980) (rejecting possibility of attempted fourth or fifth degree homicide, offenses
requiring reckless or negligent mistake as to justification, and concluding defendant cannot intend to act recklessly or negligently); State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843,
848 (Utah 1992) (rejecting offense of attempted depraved-indifference homicide);
State v. Hemmer, 531 N.W.2d 559, 564 (Neb. Ct. App. 1995) (refusing to recognize
offense of "attempted reckless assault on a peace officer"; collecting cases from
Alabama, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, New York, Oregon, Washington,
and Wisconsin holding that mens rea of recklessness will not support attempt liability).
5.
See People v. Thomas, 729 P.2d 972 (Colo. 1986) (recognizing offense of
attempted reckless manslaughter and reinstating defendant's conviction for that
offense); see also People v. Castro, 657 P.2d 932, 937-38 (Colo. 1983) (recognizing
offense of attempted extreme-indifference murder); cf. People v. Meyer, 952 P.2d
774 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997) (refusing to recognize offense of attempted felony murder); People v. Eggert, 923 P.2d 230 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995) (refusing to recognize
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mixed, though still often skeptical. Some have affirmatively
argued that the offense should exist,6 although their discussions have tended to focus either on the general scope of attempt liability or on a handful of specific hypothetical cases,
and have generally failed to contemplate the ARH offense's
offense of attempted criminally negligent homicide).
There is authority in Florida and Louisiana suggesting that in those states,
attempt may not require intent as to any resulting harm an offense requires.
That authority, however, often uses the term "intent" in a way that seems to implicate the common-law distinction, now obsolete under a proper reading of most
modern codes, between "specific intent" and "general intent." See State v. Brady,
745 So. 2d 954, 957 (Fla. 1999) (citing Gentry v. State, 437 So. 2d 1097 (Fla.
1983), for claim that "attempted second-degree murder does not require proof of
the specific intent to kill"); State v. Overfelt, 457 So. 2d 1385 (Fla. 1984) (recognizing offense of attempted third-degree murder); Gentry v. State, 437 So. 2d 1097
(Fla. 1983) (affirming conviction for attempt to commit "second-degree murder"i.e., murder "perpetrated by any act imminently dangerous to another and evincing a depraved mind regardless of human life, although without any premeditated
design to effect the death of any particular individual," see FLA. STAT. ANN. ch.
782.04(2) (2000)-based on conclusion that attempt requires only "general intent"
if completed offense also requires only "general intent"); State v. Barnett, 521 So.
2d 663, 665 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that offense of attempted cruelty to juveniles does not require specific intent as to causing "pain and suffering," but requires only "general criminal intent to mistreat or neglect"). In any case, it is
clear that in Florida, at least, the offense of attempted involuntary manslaughter
does not exist. See Taylor v. State, 444 So. 2d 931, 934 (Fla. 1983) (stating that
only attempted voluntary manslaughter, and not attempted involuntary manslaughter, is recognized in Florida).
Interestingly, some foreign jurisdictions-including, at various times, Scotland, South Africa, West Germany, and some Canadian provinces-have recognized ARH or its equivalent. See Andrew Ashworth, Criminal Attempts and the
Role of Resulting Harm Under the Code, and in the Common Law, 19 RUTGERS
L.J. 725, 756 & n.120 (1988).
6.
Indeed, some commentators take the even stronger position that there
should be no distinction, ever, between attempt liability and liability for the completed offense. See, e.g., Sanford H. Kadish, The Criminal Law and the Luck of
the Draw, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 679 (1994); Stephen J. Morse, Reason,
Results, and Criminal Responsibility, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 363. To the extent
these scholars believe acts reflecting recklessness as to causing death are sufficiently culpable to merit criminal liability (as they generally do appear to believe),
they would not only support ARH but see no distinction between ARH and reckless homicide itself. See, e.g., Kadish, supra, at 682 (giving example of Russian
Roulette, essentially an ARH or depraved-indifference scenario, as case where extent of liability should not "depend on chance," i.e., on whether fired chamber
happened to be loaded or not); Morse, supra, at 393-95 (dealing specifically with
reckless creation of risks).
That position differs from this article's claims both because it is more general,
applying to all attempt crimes rather than just ARH, and because my claims regarding the potential desirability of recognizing ARH do not also demand that
ARH receive the same degree of liability as a completed reckless homicide. Obviously, however, a number of the arguments and principles those theorists advance
would resonate with some of my claims in support of ARH.
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contours or limits in any detail.7 Others have been more
equivocal8 or have supported the offense on a narrower basis,
as by noting that the offense would exist in a few specific situations, but explicitly limiting its reach to those situations.9 Still
others conclude, like the courts, that no such offense does or
should exist. 10
7.
See, e.g., Donald Stuart, Mens Rea, Negligence and Attempts, 1968 CRIM.
L. REV. 647, 662 ("If a pharmacist is grossly negligent in making up a prescription
and the patient dies as a result of taking the dosage on the bottle[,] the pharmacist is clearly guilty of manslaughter. Surely the policy considerations which dictate such a conviction apply equally if, through chance, the negligent error is discovered before any damage is done. There seems to be every reason for a verdict
of attempted manslaughter."); GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE
GENERAL PART 619 (2d ed. 1961).
Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, writing alone and with Larry Alexander, has supported recklessness as a proper minimum basis for inchoate liability. See Kimberly D. Kessler, Comment, The Role of Luck in the Criminal Law, 142 U. PA. L.
REV. 2183, 2226-34 (1994); see also Larry Alexander & Kimberly D. Kessler, Mens
Rea and Inchoate Crimes, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1138, 1176 (1997)
("[Riecklessness should be required as the lowest mens rea for all elements of inFor
choate crimes regardless of the mens rea required in the completed crime ....
completed attempts, the mens rea with respect to each element should be exactly
the same as the mens rea required for the completed crime."); cf. Kimberly
Kessler Ferzan, Opaque Recklessness, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 597, 649
n.173 (2001) (supporting attempt liability for case involving reckless firing of numerous gunshots in police station). Ferzan and Alexander also fall into the category of scholars, mentioned supra note 6, who oppose any distinction between attempts and completed crimes. See Alexander & Kessler, supra, at 1176-77 n.78;
Larry Alexander, Crime and Culpability, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1 (1994);
Kessler, Comment, supra. For further discussion of commentary addressing the
application of attempt to crimes of recklessness, see infra Part I.A.
8.
See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW §
6.2(c)(2), at 502 (2d ed. 1986) (noting that "[iut may well be that the purposes of
the criminal law would be properly served by" imposing liability for reckless or
negligent conduct despite absence of resulting harm, but stating "it might be
questioned whether" liability should be imposed via "a redefinition of attempt
law" rather than a distinct endangerment offense); Ashworth, supra note 5, at
756-57 (noting moral similarity of reckless acts regardless of whether or not result of death ensues, but also noting that "the practical consequence [of liability
for 'reckless attempts'] would be to extend the scope of the criminal law considerably, which would in turn increase the powers of the police and the individual's
liability to both lawful and unlawful police intervention"; also pointing out the alternative of defining endangerment offenses, but noting possible flaws of that approach as well); cf. Alan C. Michaels, Acceptance: The Missing Mental State, 71 S.
CAL. L. REV. 953, 1033 (1998) (advocating attempt liability based on showing of
proposed new culpability level of "acceptance," which would be more expansive
than knowledge requirement but "would not open the floodgates to attempt liability as recklessness does, for example, by potentially turning every endangering
action into attempted manslaughter").
9.
See, e.g., R.A. DUFF, CRIMINAL ATTEMPTS 373 (Clarendon 1996). I discuss
Duff's approach in more detail infra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
10.
See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 419-20 (4th
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This article explores the bases for the frequent legal and
academic opposition to ARH. The aim here is to use the ARH
issue as a narrow window through which to view the criminal
law landscape more broadly. ARH is a useful focal point because it represents a particular anomaly within attempt law,
which frequently does allow for liability where a person is reckless as to at least some offense elements, but not where the
recklessness relates to a result required by the offense.ii
Homicide is the classic crime (and one of the few) to require a
result,12 and hence offers the most obvious avenue to explore
the anomaly. 13
The case against ARH is not as obviously correct or airtight as it may seem.14 The conceptual arguments against
ARH are mainly unpersuasive, or else too persuasive, in that
their indictment, if taken seriously, points to difficulties that
inhere in having any general rule for attempt liability. Further, despite the near-universal rejection of ARH in the courts,
even the legal status of ARH under current statutes is more
complicated than it may first appear. For example, although
the Model Penal Code's commentary specifically states its in-

ed. 2006) (arguing against attempted crimes of recklessness based on their failure
to demonstrate the same likelihood of future dangerousness as attempted crimes
of intent); Arnold N. Enker, Mens Rea and Criminal Attempts, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 845, 855-56; J.C. Smith, Two Problems in CriminalAttempts, 70
HARV. L. REV. 422, 429-34 (1957).
11.
See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 cmt. 2 at 301 (1985) (noting that attempt formulation would allow for recklessness as to circumstances, but not result). The Code recognizes three types of elements: conduct, circumstances, and
results. See id. § 1.13(9). Only circumstance and result elements are generally
relevant to recklessness; in fact, many codes do not even define recklessness as to
conduct, on the ground that "while a person may recklessly take risks concerning
present external facts [circumstances] or possible consequences [results] of his behavior, it does not make sense to speak of recklessness concerning the behavior
itself." Id. § 2.02 cmt. 3 at 239.
12.
See PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW § 3.1 at 150 (1997) ("A minority of
offenses contain a result element. Homicide offenses, personal injury offenses,
and property destruction offenses are examples of this minority of offenses; they
require a resulting physical harm.").
13.
The two other major categories of offense demanding a result are those
involving personal injury rather than death (known variously as assault or battery) and those involving damage to property (sometimes known as "mischief' offenses). Most or all of this article's claims about ARH would also apply (though
perhaps less forcefully) to attempts involving those crimes-at least, to the extent
recklessness would suffice for the completed crimes, which is sometimes but not
always the case for such offenses. For the sake of convenience and of focusing the
discussion, I concentrate the analysis on ARH.
14.
See infra Part I.
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tention to reject ARH, its general explanation of the Code's attempt formulation defines a scheme that would actually allow
ARH liability in a narrow set of cases.
Interestingly, although both codes and commentators
blanch at the idea of an offense called "attempted reckless
homicide," nobody seems to have a problem with criminalizing
the same category of conduct that would comprise ARH-or an
even broader category of conduct-by way of a separate offense:
namely, the offense of reckless endangerment ("RE").15 The
Model Penal Code, for example, ultimately dodges the issue of
whether its attempt provision covers crimes involving recklessness as to results by declaring the issue effectively moot because its RE offense covers the same ground anyway.16
Surprisingly, the literature contains barely any explanation or analysis of the nature and boundaries of the RE offense.
The commentary that does exist offers no reason to think that
RE lacks any of the flaws ARH would have. Indeed, the actual
experience with RE in the states suggests that it shares any
difficulties that would attend ARH, and may introduce new difficulties of its own.17 Further, the states themselves seem frustrated with RE in that they frequently supplement the RE offense with other, more specific offenses covering particular
forms of dangerous conduct.18 These two reactions to RE-the
apparent lack of outrage in the literature, and the apparent
lack of satisfaction in the legislatures-might both be driven by
the relatively low punishment ranges often available for the
reckless-endangerment offense.19 One might expect that very
feature of RE, however, to attract some attention. Scholars
might wonder why such a severe gap in punishment should exist between two situations (reckless homicide and RE) for
which an actor's conduct and culpability are the same, and only
the result varies. We might also ask why legislatures enact
various specific endangerment offenses with heightened pun-

15.
See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.2 (1980); see id. cmt. 1 at 197 nn.1415 (citing similar provisions adopted in state criminal codes).
16.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 cmt. 2 at 304 (1985) ("The approach of the
Model Code is not to treat such behavior [i.e., conduct recklessly risking death] as
an attempt. Instead the Code creates a separate crime, a misdemeanor, for recklessly placing another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury.").
17.
See infra Part II.A.
18.
See infra Part II.B.
19.
See infra note 160 (comparing punishment grades available for RE with
those that would exist for ARH, were it recognized).
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ishment grades, rather than simply enhancing the penalties for
the existing general RE offense.
Fundamentally, the ARH "problem" seems rooted in an
underlying, and often unstated, vision of how to write criminal
law. That vision strives to formulate legal rules that are few in
number, but broad in reach and flexible in application. For example, instead of defining numerous offenses covering specific
types of "inchoate" offenses-offenses where a criminalized
harm is risked but does not occur-this model might endorse a
single general provision prohibiting all "attempts" to commit an
offense. The resulting criminal code would be spare and its
provisions pliant, though it might also remain unable to do all
the legal heavy lifting itself, as application of its expansive and
potentially ambiguous terms in specific cases would demand
analysis and interpretation by others (judges, juries, etc.). This
model seeks to create what I will call a thin criminal code.
In striving for elegant brevity, a thin code might resort to
language so broad as to be vague or unhelpful, or might try to
make a single provision do too much. As indicated by the
Model Penal Code's apparently unwitting adoption of a formulation that allows for ARH, it is a formidable task to craft a
single attempt provision that properly maps onto the culpability and conduct requirements of all the various offenses with
which it is combined. As with clothing, the effort to make one
size fit all may lead to something that does not fit anyone especially well. And there may be some question as to whether the
cloak of attempt was even meant to fit all offenses, or whether
there were some (such as reckless homicide) it was not supposed to cover.
One might, then, prefer a code that prioritizes precision
over concision, adopting many particular rules each of which
pinpoints narrow forms of harmful conduct and takes pains to
address only that conduct. Such a code may lack the elegance
or flexibility of a thin code, whose provisions would likely be
more adaptable to changing circumstances and creative new
criminal methods,20 but would have the virtue of offering clear
notice as to which acts are prohibited.21 Its specificity might
20.
Cf. Stuart P. Green, Prototype Theory and the Classificationof Offenses in
a Revised Model Penal Code: A General Approach to the Special Part, 4 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 301, 312 (2000) ("The more specific we make offenses, the greater
the likelihood of both 'gaps' and 'redundancy' in our criminal codes .... ").
21.
Cf. Douglas N. Husak, Reasonable Risk Creation and Overinclusive Legis-
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also make for less ambiguous, hence more easily implemented,
provisions.22 This thick approach would yield a code that
would be bulkier and less flexible, yet also more powerful (at
least in terms of exercise of legislative power, as opposed to
delegating to others interpretive power over broader, more
open-ended terms).
The perceived problems with ARH seem to inhere in adopting the thin model, and its perceived solution-adopting one or
more endangerment offenses-seems to use thick-code tactics
to deal with a thin-code shortcoming. Yet if the thick model
works better for ARH, we might ask why it would not work better across the board: why not simply abandon altogether the
notoriously difficult project of trying to define a single attempt
provision?23
This choice between pursuing a thin code or a thick one
may seem purely formal, but has significant practical and political implications. The design of criminal law rules directly
affects the balance of power between the various institutional
players in the criminal justice system: the legislature, the police, prosecutors, judges, and juries. The criminal law literature, however, is itself shockingly thin when it comes to principled analysis or guidance regarding the proper method, thin or
thick, for translating abstract intuitions about what to punish
into particular rules or offenses, either generally or for specific
issues.24
Whatever the relative merits of being consistently thin or
thick, or of a principled and intentional blending of thin and
lation, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 599, 623 (1998).
22.
See Green, supra note 20 ("The more specific we are in identifying and
classifying criminal offenses, the more information such classifications give us....
Narrower offense definitions may also ease the task of the jury.").
23.
See DUFF, supra note 9, at ix ("Some believe that theorists pay altogether
too much attention to the law of criminal attempts: '[t]he literature on attempt',
remarks Gordon, 'is so extensive as to be excessive."') (quoting G.H. GORDON, THE
CRIMINAL LAW OF SCOTLAND 163 (2d ed. 1978)).
24.
The literature that does discuss methodological questions about how to
craft, or draft, criminal law rules or doctrine includes John Gardner, On the General Part of the Criminal Law, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 205 (Antony Duff ed., 1998); Green, supra note 20; Gerard E. Lynch, Towards a Model
Penal Code, Second (Federal?):The Challenge of the Special Part, 2 BUFF. CRIM.
L. REV. 297 (1998); Alan C. Michaels, "Rationales"of Criminal Law Then and
Now: For a Judgmental Descriptivism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 54 (2000); Kenneth W.
Simons, Dimensions of Negligence in Criminal and Tort Law, 3 THEORETICAL INQ.
L. 283 (2002). See also infra Part II.C (discussing work of George Fletcher and
Paul Robinson, among others).
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thick, any of these approaches is preferable to a code that
mixes thin and thick aspects indiscriminately, as most contemporary codes unfortunately do. Adding specific provisions that
expand on, or overlap with, more general provisions creates at
least three problems. First, multiple overlapping offenses tend
to create not only redundancies, but inconsistencies, making
the rules internally incoherent-presumably an inherently bad
state of affairs, but also instrumentally bad to the extent such
internal contradictions bring the law into disrepute among the
governed community.25 A second problem, related to the first,
is that where prosecution is possible under both a general attempt provision and a more specific inchoate offense provision,
it will be unclear whether to allow liability for either or both offenses. Third, the presence of both types of provisions will create the possibility of applying the general attempt provision to
the specific inchoate offenses themselves, raising the specter of
"attempted reckless endangerment" or the like. Though some
have endorsed at least the theoretical possibility of that particular offense,26 the general question of whether and when one
may attempt a crime that is itself inchoate will produce difficult questions of statutory interpretation and greatly increase
the risk that criminal liability might attach to conduct increasingly remote from any actual harm of concern to the criminal
law.
To summarize, this article seeks to offer three contributions. The first, developed in Part I, relates specifically to the
law of attempts: there seems to be no good reason to reject the
application of attempt law to crimes involving recklessness as
to a result, such as reckless homicide. Second, in Parts II.A
and II.B, the article highlights endangerment offenses, and
specifically the RE offense, as a neglected subject ripe for (and
in need of) further exploration and clarification. Third, and
25.
For a discussion of the significance of the criminal justice system's reputation to its deterrent efficacy, see PAUL H. ROBINSON & MICHAEL T. CAHILL, LAW
WITHOUT JUSTICE: WHY CRIMINAL LAW DOESN'T GIVE PEOPLE WHAT THEY
DESERVE 21-23, 128, 138-39, 183-85 (2005).
26.
See PAUL H. ROBINSON, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN CRIMINAL LAW
161-64 (1998); Kenneth W. Simons, Mistake and Impossibility, Law and Fact,
and Culpability: A Speculative Essay, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 447, 484
n.119 (1990) ("[Ilnsofar as reckless endangerment requires creation of risk, it
might itself be considered a result crime. In theory then, a person might potentially be liable for attempted reckless endangerment. However, such attempt liability would probably require a belief that one is creating, or has purpose to create, the risk.").
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most important, Parts II.C and II.D describe how the various
efforts to respond to the ARH situation implicate a more general, and largely unexplored, set of questions about how best to
translate criminal theory into criminal law.
I. THE PROBLEMS WITH ATTEMPTED RECKLESS HOMICIDE'S
"PROBLEMS"
This Part surveys the objections ARH has faced and assesses their merits. As a preliminary matter, it may be useful
to offer some examples of the conduct an ARH offense would
address, which may help illuminate its possible uses and problems.
A person plants a bomb in a building, or sets it on fire,
while reckless as to whether the building is occupied (or to be
more precise, while reckless as to whether the explosion or fire
will kill someone). If the building is occupied, and someone
dies as a result of the person's action, the bomber or arsonist is
guilty of reckless homicide. Indeed, in many jurisdictions, he
would be guilty of murder, if (as seems likely) the recklessness
is found to reflect "extreme indifference to the value of human
life."27 But even if the jurisdiction does not recognize "depraved indifference" (or it is not provable in a specific case),
where a person recklessly creates a substantial risk of deathby setting off a bomb, committing arson, firing a gun into a
crowded room or as a drive-by shooter, driving recklessly (or, in
many places, drunk)-and death ensues, the person will be liable for reckless homicide.
27.

MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(b) (1980); see also id. cmt. 4 at 26 & nn.57-

61 (citing state statutes defining some version of murder based on recklessness).
In this case, the bomber would also be liable for murder under a different
theory, if the jurisdiction has adopted (as nearly all have) some version of the felony-murder rule imposing murder liability for deaths resulting from a felony, either regardless of culpability or demanding only a reduced showing of culpability.
See Guyora Binder, The Origins of American Felony Murder Rules, 57 STAN. L.
REV. 59 (2004) (discussing history of felony murder rules); David Crump & Susan
Waite Crump, In Defense of the Felony Murder Doctrine, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 359, 360 nn.4-5 (1985) (stating that four states-Hawaii, Kentucky, New
Hampshire, and Ohio-have repealed the felony murder rule by statute, and one,
Michigan, has judicially abrogated the common law rule); Nelson E. Roth & Scott
E. Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A Doctrine at a Constitutional Crossroads,
70 CORNELL L. REV. 446, 446 n.6 (1985) (stating that "[o]nly three states no longer
use the felony-murder rule": Hawaii, Kentucky, and Michigan); Helyna M.
Hauser, Recent Decisions, 60 MD. L. REV. 909, 912-13 nn.25 & 33 (2001) (collecting statutes).
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Yet if the building is unoccupied, or if the bomb does not
detonate--or if the building is occupied and the bomb does
detonate, but no occupant is killed (even though one or more
may be seriously injured, or saved only by heroic measures)the bomber is probably guilty of no offense reflecting his lack of
concern for human life.28 He may be guilty of arson or property
damage, but those focus on other harms.29 The fact that nobody died marks the difference between homicide liability and
no liability for risking another's death, even though someone
may have come infinitesimally close to death, and even though
the lack of a death is completely fortuitous so far as the
bomber's conduct is concerned.30

This dichotomy between the death and no-death scenarios
would not exist, of course, if the bomber had a higher level of
culpability as to death. If he intended to kill someone with the
bomb, he would clearly be guilty of attempted murder even if
the bomb did not go off, the building was in fact unoccupied, or
for any other reason, nobody was killed. Indeed, under the
Model Penal Code formulation, followed by six states,31 not
only intent to kill but "knowledge" (meaning belief) that one
will cause a death would suffice to ground attempted-murder
liability.32 In other words, if the bomber is "practically cer28.
The bomber may be liable for reckless endangerment, an ARH substitute
which I discuss infra Part II.A.
29.
In some places, higher degrees of arson are defined to explicitly incorporate risks to human life or actual resulting injury-perhaps because there is no
ARH or similar offense to capture that aspect of the offender's wrongful behavior.
See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 150.15-.20 (McKinney 2004 & Supp. 2007). But this
is not a good thing. See infra Part II.C.
30.
In fact, the Model Penal Code commentary recognizes and criticizes this
anomaly in the context of defending its reckless-endangerment offense. See
MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.2 cmt. 2 at 200 (1980) ("Varying the degree of liability
according to the harm actually caused may amount to grading by fortuity. The
person who pursues a course of action despite conscious recognition of a substantial and unjustifiable risk to another is both dangerous and blameworthy.
Whether death of another actually results from his conduct, however, may depend
on factors entirely unrelated to either of these concerns ....
[Various other] factors may control the outcome, but none bear any dependable relation to the dangerousness of the actor's conduct or his blameworthiness in disregarding a risk to
human life.").
31.
See infra note 103.
32.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(b) (1985) (allowing liability for completed attempts where offender has either purpose or "belief that [her conduct]
will cause [the prohibited] result"); id. cmt. 2 at 305 ("If, for example, the actor's
purpose were to demolish a building and, knowing that persons were in the building and that they would be killed by the explosion, he nevertheless detonated a
bomb that turned out to be defective, he could be prosecuted for attempted murder
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tain"33 that the building is occupied, he may be liable for attempted murder; yet if he "consciously disregards a substantial
and unjustifiable risk" of death-that is, if he is recklessthere will be no liability for attempted homicide.34 Having
such a strict dichotomy here is odd, for the line between certainty and awareness of a substantial probability is a slippery
one,35 much more so than, say, the line between recklessness
and negligence, which marks a significant moral distinction between the presence and absence of actual subjective awareness
of a risk.36 Even so, although actual culpability in this context
exists along a continuum, the criminal law's rules are binary:
attempted murder liability for certainty, no attempt liability
(even for a lesser homicide offense) for anything short of that.
Of course, ARH presents the strongest case for attempt liability grounded in recklessness, for although recklessness is a
lower form of culpability than that usually required, in the
ARH case it is culpability as to the gravest harm the criminal
law contemplates: the taking of human life. One can easily develop both moral and practical grounds for taking such culpable disregard seriously and bringing it within the criminal
law's reach even where the risk of death does not come to fruition.37 Indeed, preventing the creation of serious and blameworthy risks of human death not only seems suitable for crimi-

even though it was no part of his purpose that the inhabitants of the building
would be killed.").
33.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b)(ii) (1985).
34.
See supra notes 4-5 (detailing near-universal rejection of ARH in American jurisdictions, with exception of Colorado); cf. infra Part I.D (discussing legal
status of ARH under proper reading of existing attempt statutes).
35.
Cf. Ferzan, supra note 7, at 621 n.82 ("The only difference between knowledge and recklessness is the degree of certainty the agent has."); Michaels, supra
note 8, at 969-70 (setting out hypothetical suggesting moral arbitrariness of distinguishing knowledge from recklessness).
36.
Cf. DUFF, supra note 9, at 147-51 (noting relevance to culpability of personal choice based on subjective beliefs, which is not present for negligent acts).
37.
See, e.g., Morse, supra note 6, at 394 ("Whether [a] risked outcome occurs
should not matter ...because this fortuity cannot guide the agent's conduct and
has no relevance to desert.... In the case of homicide, for example, this analysis
suggests that criminal liability for homicidal behavior should be based on pure
death-endangerment."); cf. ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW

422-23 (1991) ("It is certainly arguable that the reach of the inchoate offenses
should increase with the seriousness of the harm-meaning, for example, that the
law should stretch further against crimes of violence than against mere property
offenses. Surveys of English law suggest that there is no such scheme, and that
inchoate offenses (and, more particularly, substantive offenses in the inchoate
mode) have simply been increased on an ad hoc basis.").
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nal law, but should probably merit law enforcement priority
relative to other situations.38 As Stephen Morse has pointed
out, simply focusing attention on such risks may help set lawenforcement priorities about what forms of dangerous behavior
merit more or less concern:
Treating risk creation as criminal without regard to results
would have the virtue of forcing the law to determine the
degree to which certain commonly risky activities, such as
driving while intoxicated, are in fact sufficiently deathendangering per se to warrant the heavy penalties associated with homicide liability.39
Devoting resources to deterring and punishing culpably created
risks of death seems at least as worthwhile as devoting them to
some existing crimes, such as intentional attempts to bring
about a lesser harm (say, purposeful attempts to shoplift), or
even completed offenses whose gravamen is considerably less
serious than the death of a person (say, recklessly misrepresenting a fact on a government form).40
ARH, then, might close an existing gap, or at least remove
an existing anomaly: it would enable liability for conduct that
risks, but does not cause, death where (a) reckless-homicide liability would lie if the death did result, and (b) attemptedmurder liability would lie if the person performed the same
conduct but had higher culpability as to causing death. Rejecting ARH seems anomalous for at least two reasons: (a) the law
would be giving total significance (as between total homicide
liability and no liability) to the fortuity of whether a given re-

38.
See Morse, supra note 6, at 394 ("In terms of desert and danger, the sufficiently careless driver who luckily does not kill is indistinguishable from the similarly careless driver who unluckily does. I assum3, further, that we wish maximally to deter the kind of gravely death-endangering conduct that is a predicate
for vehicular homicide liability, especially if the risk would justify a conviction for
murder. This proposal would surely lead to much more careful operation of motor
vehicles, and thus to less carnage from automobile accidents-which cause many
more deaths than nonvehicular criminal homicides.").
39.
Id. at 395.
40.
For this reason, I find unpersuasive the pragmatic arguments made by
Dressler and Enker, see supra note 10. Perhaps one who attempts murder is more
dangerous than (and thus deserves more punishment than, or law enforcement
priority relative to) one who commits ARH-and the grading of ARH relative to
attempted murder would and should reflect that-but the person committing
ARH still seems more dangerous than various people who intentionally attempt
crimes of less gravity.
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sult occurs, which the criminal law does not typically do; and
(b) the law would be drawing a sharp distinction between
knowledge and recklessness, which might seem to demand further explanation given the lack of a sharp distinction between
those two mental states in the abstract.41
ARH might also apply in at least three other, more particular situations than the basic scenario described above. First,
ARH may come in handy as a practical matter based on diffi41.
Rejecting ARH may also create a third anomaly as well. Although not entirely clear, the doctrinal formulations of some jurisdictions suggest the possibility
of liability for a conspiracy to commit reckless homicide. (To give an example, a
handful of gang members who agree to go on a drive-by shooting spree might constitute such a conspiracy.) Under the widely followed Model Penal Code formulation, conspiracy differs from attempt in that it does not explicitly require purpose,
or intent, as to any result required by the target offense. Instead, the formulation
requires "the purpose of promoting or facilitating" the target offense, and an
agreement to "engage in conduct that constitutes such crime." MODEL PENAL
CODE § 5.03(1) (1985). Even though, during the drive-by itself, the gang members
may only be reckless as to whether any particular act will kill any particular person, the agreement to engage in the drive-by is done for the sake of promoting or
facilitating the offense-the danger and threat of causing death are exactly the
point.
Eight states have conspiracy provisions even more amenable to such a broad
reading of the scope of conspiracy relative to attempt, as they do not explicitly require any culpability at all for conspiracy. See FLA STAT. ANN. ch. 777.04(3) (West
2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-4-8 (2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3302(a) (1995 &
Supp. 2005); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.175(2) (West 2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.106-04(1) (1997); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 421(A) (2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-3-8
(2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-22(a) (2004).
Allowing one form of inchoate liability as to an offense while denying the possibility of other forms seems unusual, if not inconsistent, particularly since conspiracy has the potential to reach even more preliminary conduct toward an offense than attempt does. Any "overt act" toward an offense will generally suffice
to ground conspiracy liability, see, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(5) (1985),
whereas attempt liability requires something further along the spectrum from
"mere preparation" to completion-a "substantial step," or "dangerous proximity,"
or some other such rule. See infra Part I.B.
The Model Penal Code commentary, however, rejects any suggestion that the
language of the Code's conspiracy provision might allow liability based on recklessness as to a result. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03 cmt. 2(c)(i) at 408 (1985)
("[Ihen recklessness or negligence suffices for the actor's culpability with respect
to a result element of a substantive crime, as for example when homicide through
negligence is made criminal, there could not be a conspiracy to commit that
crime.").
Also, Colorado-the one state to recognize ARH-has rejected the possibility
of conspiracy to commit reckless homicide, as Colorado's conspiracy statute requires intent to commit the crime. See Palmer v. People, 964 P.2d 524, 525 (Colo.
1998) ("Our earlier cases recognizing the crimes of attempted reckless manslaughter ... are inapposite. Attempt does not require the specific intent to achieve a
criminal result .... ); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-2-201 (2006) (defining conspiracy offense).
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culties of proof with respect to an offender's culpability. In
some situations where an offender engages in clearly dangerous behavior, it may nonetheless be difficult to prove that the
person was acting with an intent to cause (or knowing he would
cause) any particular harm, such as death. In that case, recklessness might be easier to prove and ARH liability thus might
enable an otherwise impossible conviction for a person whose
conduct evinces a manifest disregard for the lives of others.
Second, ARH might also apply in situations involving intoxicated offenders.42 Many schemes effectively impute recklessness to a voluntarily intoxicated actor,43 whose condition
might create such impairment as to make her unaware of her
own conduct or its context or likely results, preventing the formation of the "conscious awareness" otherwise needed for recklessness, and possibly eliminating the level of conscious volition
required for higher levels of culpability as well. That being the
case, an intoxicated person engaging in clearly violent but only
questionably "willed" behavior might not be subject to attempted-murder liability, but the imputation rule could support ARH liability, if such an offense were recognized. This
would enable criminal liability for such an actor while recognizing a difference between truly willed, intentional acts and those
brought on by intoxication.44
Third, ARH might apply in situations involving omissions
as well as actions. Little attention has been paid to the question of attempt liability based on an omission, though many attempt provisions are written to make such liability available
where one has the requisite culpability and satisfies any other
42.
This potential application might not strike everyone as an argument in
ARH's favor, for one might take issue with the application of liability to intoxicated offenders in these cases. Such opposition, however, would reflect a more
general disapproval of the imputation rule for intoxication, rather than a reason
to reject ARH liability itself. Cf. infra Part I.C (making similar point about opposition to "attempted felony murder"). I take no position here as to the desirability
of the imputation rule as a general matter. If the rule is legitimate, however,
ARH facilitates its application to a range of relatively dangerous, violent behavior-precisely the kind of situations, I would think, where the case for applying
such a rule is strongest.
43.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(2) (1985) (intoxication causing failure to
recognize risk immaterial if sober person would have recognized risk); id. cmt. 2
at 360-61 n.29 (citing jurisdictions adopting some variant of this position).
44.
Cf. State v. Weaver, 643 N.E.2d 342 (Ind. 1994) (LSD-influenced teenager,
while suffering from hallucinations, violently attacks girlfriend, causing serious
injury; court concludes-questionably, given facts-that defendant had sufficient
intent to support attempted murder liability).
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requirements of omission liability: typically, being subject to a
legal duty to act.45 Where a person neglects to perform a legal
duty and thereby recklessly risks but does not in fact cause another person's death, ARH liability, if possible, would be appropriate.46
It seems at least possible that ARH liability might make
some sense, even if only for a limited set of situations. Why,
then, does it meet with such consistent hostility? The balance
of this Part explores the arguments against ARH. The case
against ARH proceeds on two levels: conceptual/normative and
legal/descriptive. Parts I.A-I.C explore, and find unpersuasive,
three general theoretical objections to ARH: first, that ARH is
inconsistent with the notion of an "attempt," which must involve some intent to bring about the relevant conduct; second,
that implementing ARH would present conceptual and practical problems based on the difficulty of figuring out what conduct would suffice to ground ARH liability; and third, that recognizing ARH would demand recognition of other, unwanted
crimes, specifically attempted felony murder.
The legal objection maintains that ARH is not possible
simply because current statutory formulations do not allow for
it. Part I.D examines this claim and finds that, although only
one state has recognized ARH, a number of other states also
have attempt provisions that are either ambiguous regarding
ARH or seem affirmatively to support its recognition.
A. Culpability-Related Objections: The Intention Intuition
Two general sets of critiques have been lodged against the
notion of allowing attempt liability for offenses requiring only
recklessness. The first, discussed in this section, asserts that
recklessness is a level of culpability simply incompatible with
the idea of an attempt. The basic claim is that it makes no intuitive sense (or perhaps that it makes no sense at all) to speak
of "attempting" to cause a result when one is merely reckless as
to that result's occurrence.47 Although it makes sense to speak
45.
See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(c) (1985) (attempt committed if
one "purposely does or omits to do anything that.., is an act or omission constituting a substantial step" toward the crime).
46.
Cf. Billingslea v. State, 734 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (adult
man's severe neglect of 94 year-old mother, with whom he lived, led to serious injuries and ultimately death).
47.
See Smith, supra note 10, at 434 ("The conception of attempt seems neces-
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of attempted murder, where one person purposefully tries to
kill another and fails, the concept of an "attempt" does not
seem to fit where one has no actual desire to accomplish the result "attempted," but merely recognizes that result as a possible peripheral consequence of one's actions. I describe this
view as reflecting an intention intuition with respect to the
meaning of criminal attempt.
Indeed, once upon a time, criminal punishment for attempted offenses was generally limited to such intuitively appropriate situations: a person wants to commit a crime, and

tries to, but fails, or is caught in the act. Only the apparent
fortuity48 of the non-occurrence of the offense's prohibited harm
separates the assassin from the would-be assassin who shoots,
but misses. One may argue (and many d049) that the would-be
assassin deserves less punishment than the successful one, but
few would-claim that his behavior should fall altogether outside
the reach of the criminal law.
sarily to involve the notion of an intended consequence.... When a man attempts
to do something he is 'endeavoring' or 'trying' to do it. All these ways of describing
an attempt seem to require a desired, or at least an intended, consequence. Recklessness ... [is] incompatible with desire or intention. Where, therefore, in a
crime which by definition may be committed recklessly ... but not intentionally
[and] the recklessness... relates not to a pure circumstance but to a consequence,
it is impossible to conceive of an attempt. Thus there can be no attempt to commit
involuntary manslaughter."); see also Law Commission, Report No. 102, Attempt,
and Impossibility in Relation to Attempt, Conspiracy and Incitement, 102 GREAT
BRITAIN LAW COMM'N REP. 1, 12 (1980) ("[Ilmplicit in attempt is the 'decision to
bring about, in so far as it lies within the accused's power, the commission of the
offence."') (quoting Regina v. Mohan, Q.B. 1, 11 (1976)); cf. DRESSLER, supra note
10, at 419 (noting that attempt's requirement of intent makes etymological sense,
as "[t]he word attempt means 'to try,"' but pointing out that "[t]his basis for the
common law intent requirement, however, cannot take us very far"); DUFF, supra
note 9, at 30-31 (like Dressier, noting but questioning superficial appeal of relying
on ordinary meaning of "attempt" as involving intent).
48.
Whether the absence of resulting harm is truly a mere "fortuity," or
whether it should have some moral and legal significance, is a matter of considerable dispute. For support of the position that resulting harm should not matter,
see sources cited supra note 6; see also, e.g., Ashworth, supra note 5, at 738-44,
770 (favoring "intent-based" view of attempt over "harm-based" conception, as a
"rational system for judging human behaviour should pay attention to choice, not
chance"). For support of the position that results do matter, see, for example,
DUFF, supra note 9, at 334-47, 351-54; GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING
CRIMINAL LAW § 6.6.5, at 482-83 (1978); Leo Katz, Why the Successful Assassin Is
More Wicked than the Unsuccessful One, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 791 (2000); Michael S.
Moore, The Independent Moral Significance of Wrongdoing, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 237 (1994).

49.
See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 48; Katz, supra note 48; Moore, supra
note 48.
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For some time, however, observers have thought that this
basis for attempt, if legitimate, is subject to no limiting principle explaining why attempt should cover only crimes involving
intent.50 To the extent one adopts such a subjectivist understanding of the purpose of attempt-believing that punishment
for attempt is justified by the subjective culpability of the actor,
rather than his acts or any objective risk they create51-one
should be prepared to punish, on that ground, any level of culpability recognized as sufficient to warrant criminal sanction.
(Of course, lower culpability would merit less punishment, but
there would be no obvious reason to categorically refuse to allow any punishment at all.) Accordingly, some have sought to
relax attempt's culpability rules, asserting that attempt should
apply to offenses other than those that require intent to commit
the intended crime.52
Actually, the main contemporary debate in this area
among criminal law theorists is about whether culpability
should be enough to support full liability even without harm,
rather than just reduced liability. Many theorists maintain
that the happenstance of whether an offender's culpable actions cause a resulting harm should not bear on that offender's
criminal liability.53 For some reason, though, even these theo50.

See, e.g., OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 66 (1881) ("It may

be true that in the region of attempts, as elsewhere, the law began with cases of
actual intent, as those cases are the most obvious ones. But it cannot stop with
them, unless it attaches more importance to the etymological meaning of the word
attempt than to the general principles of punishment. Accordingly there is at
least color of authority for the proposition that an act is punishable as an attempt,
if, supposing it to have produced its natural and probable effect, it would have
amounted to a substantive crime.").
51.
See FLETCHER, supra note 48, at 166-67 ("[T]he general thrust of Western
legal theory has favored the rise of subjective criminality. . . in the law of attempts. ... Since the late nineteenth century, the principle of subjective criminality has been almost unceasingly ascendant.").
52.
See sources cited supra notes 6-7. But cf. R.A. Duff, Criminalizing Endangerment, in DEFINING CRIMES 43, 58 (R.A. Duff & Stuart P. Green eds., 2005)
("[W]hilst a failed attack is structured by the harm it is intended to do, a luckily
harmless act of endangerment is further removed from the harm that it might
have caused, but did not cause; the former is still intrinsically or essentially
harmful, whilst the latter is only potentially harmful.").
53.
See Ferzan, supra note 7, at 601 n.14 (citing various theorists, including
herself, who take this position); Ashworth, supra note 5. For one classic articulation of this position, see Stephen J. Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment:A Critique
of Emphasis on the Results of Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 U. PA. L. REV.
1497 (1974). But cf. David Enoch & Andrei Marmor, The Case Against Moral
Luck, 26 LAw & PHIL. 405, 412-17 (2007) (noting that even if cases with and without resulting harm are equivalent in terms of moral blame, other considerations
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rists tend to ignore the application of their position to situations involving recklessness.54 In the recklessness situation as
in others, culpability without harm may (or may not) support
reduction in punishment, but merits at least some punishment.
It is, in fact, particularly odd to make liability depend entirely on resulting harm in the context of reckless behavior, because recklessness covers a wide variety of culpable disregard,
namely, disregard of any risk that is "substantial" but less than
"practically certain" (i.e., less than the culpable mental state of
"knowing").55 As to a risk of death, perhaps even a fairly low
probability (say, 10%) would be "substantial," but a very high
probability (say, 80-90%) would still be needed to show "practical certainty." Accordingly, without ARH, a person who recklessly creates a 20% chance of death and does kill someone will
be punished, but one who creates a 75% chance of death but
does not kill someone will receive no punishment. In other
words, one form of conduct may be objectively more dangerous,
and morally worse, than another in terms of the ex ante risk
that the actor actually created and disregarded, but the criminal law will distinguish the two based solely on the ex post result, which the actor could not control.
The general idea of allowing attempt liability to reach beyond intent has much appeal, for expansion of the culpability
requirement can help eliminate certain inconsistencies bemay justify differential legal responses based on presence or absence of harm).
The Model Penal Code itself expresses skepticism about the significance of resulting harm, questioning the basis for altering liability based on whether harm
occurs, but ultimately acceding to the widespread (however conceptually dubious)
legal practice of having results matter to liability. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §
211.2 cmt. 2 at 200-02 (1980) ("Despite the familiarity of this emphasis on results
in the law of homicide and personal injury, its logic is not unassailable .... Perhaps more persuasive [in explaining that emphasis] are arguments drawn from
practice rather than from theory.... This uniformity of practice [in punishing
completed homicide more than attempt] probably reflects much more than the
momentum of prior law. It may also evidence a widely spread and deeply rooted
conviction by the public at large that homicide is simply different from risk creation not resulting in death. While a rationalist may find the reasons for this attitude less than compelling, its existence can hardly be doubted.").
54.
See Ferzan, supra note 7, at 601 ('While many theorists advance th[e] argument [that results are irrelevant] in the context of attempts and completed
crimes, few focus on the result that his argument would have for reckless actors.
That is, such a theory commits one to holding that the reckless driver who does
not kill someone should be held as responsible as the reckless driver whose conduct results in death.").
55.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b) (1985); see also id. cmt. 1 at 233 n.4 (citing jurisdictions adopting culpability definitions based on the Code).
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tween completed and attempted crimes. For example, when attempt is limited to the old requirement of "specific intent"
rather than tracking the culpability requirements of the target
offense, a person whose liability would be mitigated from murder to manslaughter for killing someone in a fit of rage might
be unable to receive the same mitigation where he tries, but
fails, to kill the person. In such a case, a "failed manslaughter"
gives rise to liability for attempted murder-which may be a
more serious offense than a completed manslaughter, meaning
that the offender receives less punishment when he manages to
kill his victim (thus obtaining the mitigation) than when he
does not.56 The culpability requirement for attempt, in short,
enhances liability here by making the mitigation impossible.
Perhaps the more obvious problems with the specific-intent
view work in the other direction, to foreclose any liability for an
attempt even where liability clearly would be allowed for the
crime if completed, as where the foiled statutory rapist is acquitted of attempt because he did not "intend" his victim to be
underage.57
Yet although the modern view has sought to reject the earlier view of attempt as a "specific intent" crime, most current
formulations show some lingering attachment to the intention
intuition. As a result, they have a difficult time figuring out
and expressing exactly when and how to relax the culpability
rules and let something less than intent suffice for liability.58
For example, the Model Penal Code's attempt provision retains,

56.
Such is the situation in Illinois. See, e.g., People v. Lopez, 655 N.E.2d 864,
867 (Ill. 1995) ("[The intent required for attempted second degree murder [Illinois's version of voluntary manslaughter], if it existed, would be the intent to kill
without lawful justification, plus the intent to have a mitigating circumstance
present. However, one cannot intend either a sudden and intense passion due to
serious provocation or an unreasonable belief in the need to use deadly force.");
People v. Reagan, 457 N.E.2d 1260 (Ill. 1983).
Cases that would otherwise be treated as attempted second-degree murder
(the equivalent of attempted voluntary manslaughter) are thus treated as attempted first-degree murder, an offense which is graded more seriously than a
completed second-degree murder. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-4(c)(1) (West
2002) (attempted first-degree murder; Class X felony subject to further aggravation); id. 5/9-2 (second-degree murder; Class 1 felony).
57.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 cmt. 2 at 301-02 (1985) (discussing this
example and explaining how the Code's formulation, which does not demand purpose as to circumstances, avoids this result).
58.
Part I.D infra considers in depth the various formulations of attempt that
American criminal codes (including the Model Penal Code) actually adopt, and the
relation of those formulations to the ARH question.
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for incomplete attempts,59 a requirement of intent (or "pur-

pose," in the Code's language) as to any required result, even
where the completed crime requires something less than intent.60 Such a formulation excludes even attempts where the
actor knows the prohibited result will occur-although it is not
his "purpose" or "intent" to cause that result-and where such
knowledge would be sufficient to ground liability for the completed offense if the result actually occurred, or even, under a
separate part of the Code's provision, if the attempt had been
completed but was still unsuccessful.61 An example highlights
the problem:
Assume an actor places a bomb in a military services draft
board knowing it will kill the persons therein. He does not
want to kill such persons, his object is only to destroy the
building, but he knows that when he pushes the detonator
the people are practically certain to be killed. If he is
caught by police after the explosion causes deaths, he is liable for murder [because the murder offense requires only
knowledge as to causing death]. If he is caught just before
he presses the detonator, he is not liable for attempted
murder .... He may be liable for other offences but escapes
liability for attempted murder because it is not his conscious
object to cause death.62

Even for crimes requiring only recklessness, rather than
knowledge, attempt liability may sometimes be appropriate.
For example, the person stopped just before dumping toxic
59.
By "incomplete" attempt, I mean one for which the offender has not yet
performed all of the conduct that would, if successful, constitute the target offense. Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(b) (1985) (defining specific rule for attempts where actor has performed all conduct necessary to cause prohibited result, i.e., completed attempts). A classic completed attempt is the shoot-and-miss
scenario, where no further act is need beyond firing the shot; the attempt fails
only because of the inaccuracy of the shot. An incomplete attempt would be one
where the shot has not yet been fired, but the actor has done enough to be liable
for an attempt-say, buying the gun, loading it, pursuing the victim, aiming and
preparing to fire.
60.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 cmt. 2 at 301-05 (1985) (explaining that
the Code retains a requirement of purpose as to all elements for attempt, with two
exceptions: as to circumstance elements, the culpability requirement of the target
offense governs; and where the attempt is complete, i.e., all conduct has been performed, "belief' as to result will suffice).
61.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(b) (1985) (allowing "belief' to suffice for
completed attempts).
62.
PAUL H. ROBINSON, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN CRIMINAL LAW 159
(1998).
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waste in a river, upstream from the town swimming hole,
should be guilty of attempted reckless endangerment.63 We
might similarly envision cases where ARH liability might be
appropriate; I have discussed a few earlier.64
The Model Penal Code's attempt provision therefore draws
two significant lines, at least as to offenses involving some required result. First, it draws a line between incomplete attempts, for which the Code demands purpose as to any required result, and complete attempts, for which "knowledge" as
to a result suffices. Second, within the world of complete attempts, it draws a line between "knowledge" as to a result,
which may ground liability, and recklessness, which may not.
Holding aside the validity of drawing the first of these lines,
which at least facially has the virtue of specifying a fairly clear
subset of attempts for which the culpability requirement is relaxed, the second line appears arbitrary. Especially in the
homicide context (to single out the most prominent category of
offenses having any result element), there is not always a lot of
moral difference between knowledge and recklessness. True, a
person who acts with recklessness only has a sense that the result might happen, rather than "knowing" that it will happen;
but that is often because he doesn't especially care whether the
result happens, and thus can't be bothered to find out or figure
out how likely it is to occur. The person recognizes a significant risk to human life, but is interested in performing a certain act, or achieving some other result, regardless of that risk.
Significantly, the law of homicide, if not the law of attempt, recognizes the way in which recklessness shades toward
having the moral gravity of knowledge or even intent. Most jurisdictions define a form of murder based on recklessness indicating an "extreme indifference to the value of human life,"65 or
some equivalent formulation.66
In defining the completed
crime, then, the law recognizes the moral equivalence of at
least some reckless killings with knowing or intentional killings.67 The law of attempt, however, undermines rather than
63.
See id. at 161.
64.
See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
65.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(b) (1980).
66.
See id. cmt. 4 at 22 n.38 (citing twenty-three states recognizing some form
of "depraved heart" murder prior to drafting of Code); id. at 26-27 (citing nineteen
codes and six proposed codes, some from states appearing on earlier list, that
adopt some version of reckless murder, and sixteen codes that do not).
67.
Cf. R.A. Duff, CriminalizingEndangerment: A Response to Marcelo Fer-
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tracks this recognition, for the same culpability rules that prevent ARH also prevent imposition of liability for attempted
murder of the depraved-indifference sort. This aspect of the
operation of attempt law refutes the potential claim of opponents of reckless-attempt liability that limiting attempt liability to cases involving intent or knowledge would simply lead to
a proper focus on the most serious crimes while weeding out
other offenses thought to be less serious. Here the attempt
provision works to exclude attempt liability for (one version of)
the most serious crime.
Like the Code, some criminal-law scholars, including R.A.
Duff and Paul Robinson, have tried to describe versions of attempt that expand its scope while adhering to some version of
the intention intuition. Robinson has proposed a formulation
of attempt that requires intent as to one's own future course of
conduct, but does not require intent as to the result of that conduct:
The actor's future conduct intention is central to the definition of what constitutes a criminal attempt; the actor must
have as his purpose to engage in the conduct that constitutes the offense. There is no apparent reason, however,
why the culpability requirements of the substantive offense,
which serve the liability function, must be elevated to [intent] .68

Under this view, the person who is caught while carrying toxic
waste to the river can be held liable for attempted endangerment; although his purpose was only to get rid of the waste,
and not to cause the harm of endangering others, he did intend
to carry out all the conduct necessary to bring about that
harm.69
Duff s theory, in somewhat similar fashion, describes the
culpability requirement for attempt as "an intention such that
rante's Comment, 65 LA. L. REV. 983, 986 (2005) ("I argue that the two types of
action-attacks and endangerments-are morally different, but that is not the
same as arguing that they are differently located on a single scale of moral wrongfulness: 'different' does not entail 'better' or 'worse[.]"').
68.
ROBINSON, supra note 61, at 161; cf. Alexander & Kessler, supra note 7, at
1170 ("To us, the most coherent justification both for inchoate criminal liability
and for having a criminal purpose... as a requirement for such liability. . . rests
on the assumption that forming an intention to engage in future criminal conduct
is itself a culpable act[.]").
69.
ROBINSON, supra note 61, at 161.
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the agent would necessarily commit a complete offence in carrying it out."70 Here again, the idea is that one has a planned

course of conduct that, if successful, would constitute a crimeincluding, perhaps, a crime demanding only recklessness as to
a result. Duff gives the example of attempted property damage, an offense that in Britain requires only recklessness as to
damaging another's property:
A gardener tries to cut down what she realizes might well
be her neighbour's tree. She is guilty of attempted criminal
damage if it actually is her neighbour's tree: she acts with
an intention [to cut down this tree] such that, given that it
is her neighbour's property and her recklessness as to that

fact, she would necessarily commit a complete offence of
criminal damage in carrying it out.71

As with Robinson, one may be liable based on one's intent to go
forward with conduct that actually amounts to the crime, even
if one is only reckless as to causing the resulting harm the
crime addresses.
Both Robinson and Duff, then, suggest that ARH liability
would at least sometimes be possible, but both have a difficult
time drawing clear theoretical or practical lines around when it
should apply, and when not. Duff offers examples of how his
formulation would treat some different ARH scenarios:
A hunter fires at what he thinks is probably a deer but realizes may be a person. If it is a person, he is guilty of manslaughter [i.e., reckless homicide] if he kills her, and my test
convicts him of attempted manslaughter if he fails to kill
her[.] ... [But] compare the hunter with someone who,

without intending to kill, commits some recklessly dangerous action which would make him guilty of manslaughter if
he caused death: for example, someone who dynamites a
building, realizing that this might well kill people living
nearby, but taking no adequate steps to warn or protect
them. The risk of human death which he knowingly creates
might be greater than that which this hunter knowingly
creates: but my test acquits him of attempted manslaughter[.]72

70.
71.
72.

DUFF, supra note 9, at 371.
Id. (brackets in original).
Id. at 373.
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The underlying idea seems to be that Duff still wants to require
intent as to the result of the crime, narrowly defined (causing
death), but not as to the circumstances of the crime, broadly defined (causing death of a person). The conceptual distinction is
coherent-interestingly, as Part I.D discusses, it is the same
distinction the Model Penal Code makes, albeit inadvertently73--but Duff himself seems to recognize the difficulty of
offering a principled explanation for why these disparate results should occur, except that they follow from his conception
of attempt as an attack.74
73.
74.

See infra notes 103-14 and accompanying text.
Duff notes that the example:
might also strike some as counter-intuitive

....

This distinction which

my test draws between the hunter and the dynamiter will also seem implausible if we see the law of attempts as a law of endangerment, aiming
to penalize culpably dangerous conduct. If instead we see the law of attempts as concerned with attacks, we can see a crucial difference between the two agents. For the hunter, although he does not intend his
action as an attack upon human life, in fact attacks a human life: he
tries [to kill] a living being which is in fact human .... By contrast, the
dynamiter recklessly endangers human life, but is not attacking human
life.
DUFF, supra note 9, at 373 (brackets in original). Duff's description may be accurate, but it does not explain why we should "see the law of attempts as concerned
with attacks," even where doing so forces distinctions between cases that seem
equivalent in all relevant ways (to me, at least). To put it differently, Duff does
not explain why it is useful or proper-much less dispositive-to focus narrowly
on the hunter's intent "to kill" (which makes his act an attack "in fact") rather
than considering his mental attitude toward the situation more broadly (trying to
kill a deer while noting that it might not be a deer).
Duff suggests the victim's perception of the offender's act as an attack, rather
than as (merely) dangerous behavior, is somehow meaningful:
The hunter's potential victim might reasonably reproach him by saying
'you tried to kill me!'. . . . The most the dynamiter's potential victims

could say, however, is 'you might have killed me!'. The difference between 'you tried to kill me' and 'you might have killed me' marks the difference between attempted homicide and mere endangerment.
Id. I suspect in both cases, the would-be victim's response would be more like,
"Are you trying to kill me or something?"--and even an honest answer of "or
something" would not be very satisfying to that person in either case. In any
event, the moral relevance of characterizing an action as an "attack" rather than
endangerment (either as an objective matter or as experienced by the victim) is
somehow lost on me, and Duff's hunter-dynamiter examples only strengthen my
sense that he is banking on some moral intuition I do not share. Perhaps others
do. Cf. Douglas Husak, Attempts and the PhilosophicalFoundationsof Criminal
Liability, 8 CRIM. L.F. 293, 298 (1997) ("I am unsure, however, of the criteria by
which I would pronounce [Duff's positions] to be correct or incorrect. Perhaps
they should be brought into 'reflective equilibrium' with our intuitions. My own
intuitions, however, are silent or ambivalent about several of the outcomes that
Duff favors in hypothetical and not-so-hypothetical cases.").
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Robinson focuses on attempt as a frustrated course of conduct that would culminate in the offense if not frustrated. But
in the ARH situation, how can we know for sure whether the
person's planned course of conduct would have resulted in another's death? Sometimes it seems that when Robinson talks
about intent to "engage in the conduct constituting the offence,"75 what he means, or necessarily assumes, is an intent to
engage in conduct that would in fact cause whatever harm the
offense requires.76 (Duffs conception of an "attack" may well
be similar.) In other words, it looks like Robinson is not only
imposing a culpability requirement regarding one's own future
conduct; he is also imposing, or implying, an objective requirement that the planned conduct would in fact "constitute the offense." We cannot merely examine the person's mental state as
to his own future course of conduct; we must also bring to bear
an objective sense of the likely effects of that conduct-and,
perhaps, of how likely those effects are-if we are to distinguish lawful intended conduct from unlawful intended conduct.
More frequently, however, Robinson disavows any such requirement of an objective likelihood, or certainty, of causing the
prohibited result. In fact, Robinson generally maintains that
we do not need a causation requirement to define the conduct
that the criminal law prohibits. Instead, he holds that causation is relevant only to the issue of grading what is acknowledged to be criminal conduct:
The role of the causation requirement-defining the relation
between an actor's conduct and a result that gives rise to an
actor's accountability for the result-similarly serves the
grading function and not the rule articulation function [i.e.,
the task of defining prohibited conduct]. Like the requirement of a result, the causation rules determine when an ac75.

ROBINSON, supra note 61, at 162; see also id. at 164 ("As long as the law is

careful to require that it is the actor's conscious object to engage in the conduct
constitutingthe offence, there seems little reason that attempts to create risks and
attempts that create risks ought not be punished.").
76.
He does sometimes express his own position in terms compatible with
such an interpretation. See, e.g., id. at 158 ("It is true that the actor's purpose to
complete the conduct that would cause the death must be clear.") (emphasis
added); id. at 163 (supporting attempt liability where "a deliberate choice is made
to bring about the consequence forbidden by the criminal law, and the actor has
done all within his power to cause this result to occur") (emphases added). Yet his
insistence elsewhere that conduct requirements can be specified without regard to
results or causation renders unclear his degree of agreement with the reading of
his attempt formulation presented in the text above.
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tor's liability is aggravated because the actor is accountable
for a harmful result. Because result elements and causation
requirements are not necessary to define the conduct prohibited by the criminal law, it is not surprising that liability
does not necessarily depend upon them.77
Moreover, Robinson clearly believes that objective impossibility
is no defense to attempt.78 It is hard to reconcile that position
with any claim that ARH, or any other attempt, requires some
level of objective probability.
In any case, even if not altogether clear or satisfying as to
the dimensions of ARH liability, both Duff and Robinson offer
accounts that imply its possibility while still holding on to some
version of the intention intuition for attempt. In short, we can
accommodate that intuition on some level and also impose
ARH liability in at least some cases.
More fundamentally, of course, one might wonder whether
we need to accommodate the intuition at all. The intention intuition is based only on our casual, everyday understanding of
the word "attempt," but we need not be limited by that understanding when making decisions about the substantive content
of criminal law. We could choose to call the offense "inchoate
crime" or "threatening (or risking) offense harm," and the need
to make liability match our intuitive sense of the word "attempt" would disappear. There is no reason, in short, for
criminal liability merely to track semantics rather than to provide a conceptually satisfying theory of what merits liability.79
B. Conduct-Related Objections
Common views of the culpability requirement for attempt,
then, would seem to accommodate the possibility of ARH. But
does this mean we should have ARH? If we did, how would we
know when it had been committed? That issue introduces its
own set of complications, in part because there has been a
modern tendency in both theory and practice to shift the moment at which "mere preparation" becomes a criminal attempt
77.
Id. at 128.
78.
Id. at 162-63 ("Ought [an] actor escape liability for attempted murder because of the factual impossibility of completion? All would agree that he ought
not escape attempt liability.").
79.
See Ashworth, supra note 5, at 756 ("[T]he limitations of language should
not be allowed to override moral similarities.").
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to an earlier link on the causal chain leading up to the completed offense. In other words, under modern formulations, the
conduct requirement for attempt has been relaxed, as well as
the culpability requirement (discussed in Part I.A). Yet if both
the culpability requirement and the conduct requirement are
loosened, so that attempt liability demands only the presence of
the completed offense's required culpability level plus some
fairly modest action tending toward the harmful result, a person might be guilty of ARH merely because he was caught driving too fast; or a drunk person might be liable as soon as she
put the key in the ignition, based on her willingness to create a
risk of death. Allowing attempted-homicide liability to reach so
far seems both impractical and morally questionable.
This, then, is the second objection to ARH: that its recognition might open the floodgates, and suddenly all sorts of behavior will be treated as ARH, because there will be no way to
cabin the conduct requirement to exclude inappropriate
cases.80 The concern, however, is a mere phantom-or rather,
it has some validity, but to the extent it is valid, it describes an
issue that is not unique to ARH, but could arise as to any incomplete attempt to commit an offense, regardless of that offense's culpability requirements.
As an initial matter, it is significant to note that many
cases would generate no difficulty in terms of whether an offender satisfied the conduct requirement for an attempt. For
completed attempts, where the person has performed all the
conduct necessary to cause the result (firing a gun, setting off
an explosive), the person's culpability and willingness to act on
it are equally clear for reckless as for purposeful conduct.
Shooting at someone else should satisfy any attempt conduct
rule, whether the shot is fired recklessly or intentionally.
Moreover, anything short of a completed attempt will necessitate a potentially tricky judgment under the conduct rule
regardless of whether the behavior is intentional or reckless.
Consider, for example, a man who is not driving recklessly (or
drunk), but plans to drive over to someone's apartment to murder her. We still have the same question about when his "mere
preparation" becomes an attempt. Is it when he loads the gun
in his own home? When he gets in his car? When he gets out
80.
See Michaels, supra note 8, at 1033 (asserting that reckless-attempt liability would create a floodgates concern, "for example, by potentially turning every
endangering action into attempted manslaughter").
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of his car, outside the victim's apartment building, with the
gun in his pocket?
The common and relatively relaxed "substantial step"
test8l offers no clear answer here, nor does it seek to.82 But definitive answers would be equally unavailable under even a
"dangerous proximity" or other test that seeks to narrow the
range of attempt liability by demanding more conduct before an
attempt occurs. Any general conduct requirement for attempt
liability must be fundamentally indeterminate, as it seeks to
provide a single rule that applies to all of the various offenses
that one might attempt, whose underlying elements may vary
greatly. Every formulation proposed so far shares this vagueness: an attempt demands "more than mere preparation,"83 or
a "substantial step,"84 or acts in "dangerous proximity" to the
offense,85 or that a person must "embark on" the offense.86
ARH thus presents no specific problem as to figuring out
what constitutes (or should constitute) an attempt. The real
potential problem here, an intractable problem with all attempts, is an evidentiary one about the proof needed to support
liability in specific cases, and if anything, the evidentiary considerations should actually cut against the floodgates concerns
in the ARH context. ARH liability would demand proof beyond
a reasonable doubt both that the person (1) was reckless as to,
and (2) engaged in some specified amount of conduct in the direction of, committing the offense (i.e., causing another's
death). Such proof would likely be hard to furnish in the vast
majority of cases except those involving a completed attempt.
It should not be surprising, then, that Colorado, the one state
to recognize ARH, has not experienced any apparent difficulties
81.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(c) (1985); see id. cmt. 3(c) at 320 n.95; id.
cmt. 6(a) at 331-32 n.130 (citing jurisdictions adopting substantial-step formulation).
82.
See id. cmt. 6(a) at 329 ("Whether a particular act is a substantial step is
obviously a matter of degree. To this extent, the Code retains the element of imprecision found in most of the other approaches to the preparation-attempt problem.").
83.
See U.K. Criminal Attempts Act of 1981 § 1(1) (requiring "an act which is
more than merely preparatory to the commission of the offence").
84.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(c) (1985).
85.
See Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 388 (1912) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also Commonwealth v. Peaslee, 59 N.E. 55, 56 (Mass. 1901).
86.
DUFF, supra note 9, at 390 (describing, and endorsing, UK Court of Appeal's interpretation of UK statute's "more than merely preparatory" language to
require that offender must have "embarked on" the offense, or be "in the process of
committing" the offense).
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in terms of prosecution of negligible or borderline conduct as
ARH. Indeed, although Colorado's attempt provision requires
only a substantial step toward an offense,87 all of the reported
ARH cases in Colorado involve completed attempts.88
Concerns about the parameters of the conduct standard for
attempt are bound to arise for any form of attempted offense,
at least in cases arising at the margins. It is always hard to
draw a line for incomplete attempts, which might indicate a
problem with the conduct requirement more broadly, or even
with the notion of having a single attempt provision that applies to numerous offenses at once, rather than with the specific application of that provision to offenses requiring only
recklessness as to a result.89 None of the conduct rules developed for attempt is inherently more or less problematic in the
ARH context than in any other. They are all deliberately
fluffy, meant to be applied to specific situations post hoc. But if
we trust post hoc decision-making in other contexts, why not
trust it for ARH? Indeed, should we not expect that juries will
press prosecutors even harder to supply clear proof as to the
conduct requirement for crimes involving reduced culpability?
On the other hand, if we object to such a scheme, perhaps that
suggests the entire thin-code project of writing a single, broad
attempt provision is misguided.
87.
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-2-101(1) (2006).
88.
To date, sixteen Colorado appellate opinions involve cases where the defendant was convicted of attempted extreme-indifference murder or attempted
reckless manslaughter. Ten of the cases involve shootings. See People v. Thomas,
729 P.2d 972 (Colo. 1986); People v. Castro, 657 P.2d 932, 937-38 (Colo. 1983);
People v. Beatty, 80 P.3d 847 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003); People v. Anderson, 70 P.3d
485 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002); People v. Allen, 43 P.3d 689 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001); People v. Ellis, 30 P.3d 774 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001); People v. Palmer, 944 P.2d 634
(Colo. Ct. App. 1997); People v. McCoy, 944 P.2d 584 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996) (crossbow shooting); People v. Lee, 914 P.2d 441 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995); People v. Rodriguez, 888 P.2d 278 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).
Four cases involve stabbings. See People v. Young, 16 P.3d 821 (Colo. 2001);
People v. Tallwhiteman, 124 P.3d 827 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005); People v. Silva, 987
P.2d 909 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999); People v. Requejo, 919 P.2d 874 (Colo. Ct. App.
1996) (based on complicity).
One case, and the only one whose opinion discusses the issue of whether a
"substantial step" had occurred, involves bludgeoning with a hammer. See People
v. Ramos, 708 P.2d 1347 (Colo. 1985) (reversing judgment of acquittal and reinstating jury conviction of attempted extreme-indifference murder).
The final case involves sexual assaults by an HIV-positive offender. See People v. Perez, 972 P.2d 1072 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998) (reversing conviction based on
lack of requisite culpability).
89.
Cf. Alexander & Kessler, supra note 7, at 1173-74 (advocating abolition of
liability for incomplete attempts).
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C. The Pandora'sBox Objection: Attempted Felony Murder
A third critique of ARH, like the conduct-based critique
discussed in Part I.B, raises a floodgates concern of a different
type. Here the fear is not that the ARH offense itself would be
far-reaching and might apply to inappropriate cases, but that
recognition of ARH would necessitate recognition of other, undesirable forms of attempt as well. The specific worry mentioned in this context is that if ARH were allowed, there would
be no logical or legal obstacle to allowing a crime of "attempted
felony murder" also.90 I offer three responses to this critique of
ARH.
First, it is important to recognize that the central problem
with attempted felony murder is not the "attempt" part, but the
"felony murder" part. That is, the visceral reaction that liability for attempted felony murder would be improper draws on,
and reflects, an underlying sense that the completed offense of
felony murder is itself improper-which is an almost universal
If recognizing
opinion about the felony-murder doctrine.91
ARH means that we would have to recognize attempted felony
murder as well, the conclusion that such an outcome would be
unpalatable only serves to highlight the absurdity or undesirability of felony murder, rather than to indicate any problem
with the extension of attempt liability to reckless homicide. An
entirely possible, and altogether superior, way to avoid atSee, e.g., SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW
90.
AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 561 (7th ed. 2001) (noting Colorado's
recognition of ARH and asking whether this demands recognition of attempted
felony murder as well). For a description of felony murder, see supra note 27.
See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. 6 at 37-39 (1980) (stating that
91.
"[p]rincipled argument in favor of the felony-murder doctrine is hard to find," asserting that the argument in its favor "reduces to the explanation that Holmes
gave for finding the law 'intelligible as it stands,"' and explaining why that position offers no principled basis for retaining the doctrine); DRESSLER, supra note
10, at 558 (quoting cases stating that the doctrine "has been bombarded by intense criticism and constitutional attack" and that "[c]riticism of the rule constitutes a lexicon of everything that scholars and jurists can find wrong with a legal
doctrine"); see also George P. Fletcher, Reflections on Felony-Murder, 12 Sw. U. L.
REV. 413 (1981); James J. Tomkovicz, The Endurance of the Felony-MurderRule:
A Study of the Forces That Shape Our Criminal Law, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1429, 1448-49 (1994) (stating that the doctrine's "primary justification" is deterrence, but that any claims "that it actually achieves its goals are rooted in blind
faith or self-delusion," so the rationale offers a "poor excuse" for abandoning the
usual commitment to requiring culpability). For one of the very few defenses of
the doctrine, see David Crump & Susan Waite Crump, In Defense of the Felony
Murder Doctrine, 8 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 359 (1985).
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tempted felony murder would be to allow ARH but abolish felony murder altogether.
A second, and related, response is that even if felony murder had to remain on the books, attempt liability could be expanded to reach crimes of recklessness without being expanded
to reach crimes of strict liability. Requiring recklessness to
serve as a floor for attempt liability would be a coherent and
defensible approach, as it would comport with a sense (somewhat in keeping with the intention intuition) that attempt or
inchoate liability should rest on a choice or decision to act while
having culpability as to the occurrence of a criminal offense.
Some have argued that recklessness should be a minimum prerequisite to any criminal liability, not just attempt liability.92
But even without going that far, one can take the view that attempt liability exists to punish, even in the absence of harm,
one who has culpability and manifests a willingness to act on
it.
Third and finally, even if attempted felony murder were
possible, it would almost certainly be rare and (like ARH itself,
as discussed in Part I.B) would not reach the broad spectrum of
behavior the critics assume. The critics' claim is that if attempted felony murder existed, somehow every felony would
constitute attempted felony murder.93 But why would that be
the case? Attempted felony murder would demand proof beyond
a reasonable doubt that the felon had performed a substantial
step, or whatever amount of conduct the jurisdiction requires,
toward the offense, with the offense here being causing a death
during a felony. The felony itself, unless it involved a significant inherent risk of death, would not clearly be a substantial
92.
The debate is typically cast in terms of whether criminal liability may be
based on negligence; those opposing negligence liability hold that recklessness
should be the minimum culpability requirement. For discussions of the issue, see,
for example, MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. 4 at 243 (1985) ("No one has doubted
that purpose, knowledge, and recklessness are properly the basis for criminal liability, but some critics have opposed any penal consequences for negligent behavior."); DRESSLER, supra note 10, at 141-42; Jerome Hall, Negligent Behavior
Should Be Excluded From Penal Liability, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 632 (1963); Kenneth W. Simons, Culpability and Retributive Theory: The Problem of Criminal
Negligence, 5 J. CONTEMP. ISSUES 365 (1994) (discussing arguments for and
against negligence liability).
93.
See, e.g., KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 90, at 561 (asking, without
taking a position as to, the questions "why wouldn't every armed robbery in which
the victim is not killed amount to an attempted felony-murder? ... Would every
robber and burglar be guilty of attempted felony murder, even if shots were never
fired and none of the victims suffered any physical injury?").
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step toward causing a death; and if it did involve such an inherent risk, attempted homicide liability would seem appropriate. As with ARH, it might be possible to prosecute completed
attempts, like firing gunshots during a felony, as attempted
felony murder, but why would that necessarily be so bad? Presumably the added specter of attempted-felony-murder liability
for such conduct would offer an additional deterrent against
committing felonies, or against firing shots during one. In
other words, it would serve precisely the objective felony murder itself is designed to achieve.94 Again, if this rationale is
unsatisfying, it is because felony murder itself is unsatisfying,
not because attempted felony murder would introduce any new
and insoluble problems.
D. Legal Objections
Beyond the general abstract objections that have been
lodged against ARH, it is worth examining the status of ARH
under current law, for that status is more dubious than it
might appear at first blush. Part L.A documented the tension
between the historical and intuitive insistence that attempt
must demand some form of intent and the conflicting sense
that liability may seem appropriate in some cases where the offender lacked intent as to all elements of the offense. The
Model Penal Code and many other modern codes try to strike
some balance in their attempt provisions between retaining an
intent requirement and accommodating some cases where intent is lacking as to some elements. Interestingly, in striking
that balance, many of these provisions adopt formulations
whose terms allow for ARH, even though the Model Penal
Code's commentary explicitly shies away from the suggestion of
possible ARH liability and state courts (with the exception of
Colorado) have steadfastly avoided the possibility of ARH.
It is certainly true that many American criminal codes
have attempt provisions that do not seem to allow for any pos-

94.
See DRESSLER, supra note 10, at 558 ('The most common defense of the
felony-murder rule is that it is intended to deter negligent and accidental killings
during the commission of felonies."); HOLMES, supra note 50, at 59; Tomkovicz,
supra note 91; see also State v. Goodseal, 553 P.2d 279, 285 (Kan. 1976) ("[The]
rational function of the felony-murder rule is to furnish added deterrent to the
perpetration of felonies which, by their nature or by the attendant circumstances,
create a foreseeable risk of death.").
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sibility of ARH. Five states,95 and the federal criminal code, do
not have a general attempt provision at all. Three of those jurisdictions instead have provisions defining specific attempt offenses, such as attempted murder (but not ARH);96 the other
three have developed the doctrine of attempt exclusively
through case law (in which none has recognized ARH).97 Another nine codes (eight states and the District of Columbia)
have provisions simply prohibiting any "attempt" to commit an
offense, without defining or otherwise clarifying that term.98
Here again, the actual content of the attempt rules is supplied
by case law-and here again, the jurisdictions addressing the
issue have uniformly rejected ARH.99
95.
Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Rhode Island.
See IOWA CODE § 707.11 (West 2003) (defining offense of attempted mur96.
der); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 16 (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2006) (defining offense of "attempt to commit murder by poisoning, drowning or strangling"); id., at
ch. 266, § 5A (defining offense of attempted arson); 18 U.S.C. § 1113 (2000) (defining offense of attempted murder or manslaughter). The U.S. Code provision has
been interpreted to disallow ARH. See Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344,
351 (1991).
97.
Maryland and North Carolina have no general provision defining attempt,
but do have provisions addressing the grading of "attempts" for sentencing purposes. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 1-201 (LexisNexis 2002); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-2.5 (2005 & Supp. 2006). Maryland also has specific provisions for "attempt to commit murder in the second degree" and "attempted poisoning," which
carry specified punishment ranges. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §§ 2-206, 3213 (LexisNexis 2002). To the extent such provisions imply a catchall, undefined
category of punishable criminal attempts, these states would belong with the nine
jurisdictions mentioned next in the text. As noted in text, case law in both states
makes clear that neither recognizes ARH. See Dixon v. State, 772 A.2d 283, 288
n.9 (Md. 2001) ("There is no such crime as attempted involuntary manslaughter."); State v. Coble, 527 S.E.2d 45, 48 (N.C. 2000) ("Because specific intent to kill
is not an element of second-degree murder, the crime of attempted second-degree
murder is a logical impossibility under North Carolina law."). Rhode Island defines no attempt offenses at all in its code, and also has no cases discussing the
possibility of ARH or its equivalent.
98.
See D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-1803 (2001 & Supp. 2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch.
777.04 (2000); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-306 (2004); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
750.91 (West 2004); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1-80 (2003) (referring to "the common
law offense of attempt"); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-4-1 (2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
13, § 9 (1998 & Supp. 2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-25, 26 (2004); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 61-11-8 (LexisNexis 2005).
99.
See People v. Genes, 227 N.W.2d 241, 242 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975) ("While
there can be no such thing as attempted involuntary manslaughter, where the
theory is voluntary manslaughter there can be an attempt."); State v. Lyerla, 424
N.W.2d 908 (S.D. 1988); State v. Davis, 601 A.2d 1381, 1383 (Vt. 1991) (noting
that "the crime of attempted manslaughter requires the specific intent to kill").
The District of Columbia, Idaho, South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia do
not seem to have directly addressed the question of ARH liability. For discussion
of the Florida case law, see supra note 5.
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As for the codes that do genuinely define the concept of an
attempt, their formulations generally fall into four categories
with respect to culpability requirements.100 The first, and
largest, category contains the twenty states whose definitions
of attempt do not distinguish between different offense elements with respect to culpability, but impose a blanket requirement of intent or purpose to commit the target offense,
thereby clearly rejecting ARH.101 The other three categories
contain codes whose culpability requirements are either more
complex or less clear.
The second group includes the nine states that, more or
less,102 follow the formulation of the Model Penal Code, at least
100.
For the reader's convenience, the following table summarizes the four
categories discussed over the next several pages of text (as noted in text above,
the codes of the remaining 15 American jurisdictions have no attempt provision or
fail to define the concept of attempt):

1
2
3

# of Codes in
Category
20
9
4

4

4

Category

Culpability Test

ARH allowed?

Intent
Follows MPC
Tracks completed
offense
[Various]

No
Yes (limited)
Yes
[Mixed]

101.
See ALA. CODE § 13A-4-2 (LexisNexis 2005); ALASKA STAT. § 11.31.100
(2006); CAL. PENAL CODE § 664 (West 1999 & Supp. 2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-4-1
(2004); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-4 (West 2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3301
(1995 & Supp. 2005); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:27 (1997 & Supp. 2007); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 609.17 (West 2003); MO. ANN. STAT. § 564.011 (West 2000); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 45-4-103 (2005); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193.330 (LexisNexis 2006);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 629:1 (1996 & Supp. 2006); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-28-1
(2004); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 110.00 (McKinney 2004 & Supp. 2007); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 901 (West 1998 & Supp. 2006); TEX. PENAL CODE § 15.01 (Vernon 2003);
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.28.020 (West 2000); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.32 (2005); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 6-1-301 (2006). Mississippi's formulation applies to "anyone who
shall design and endeavor to commit an offense," which seems equivalent to a requirement of intent or purpose. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-1-7 (2006).
102.
See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1001 (2001 & Supp. 2006); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 5-3-201 (2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-49 (West 2001); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 531 (2001); HAW. REV. STAT. § 705-500 (1993 & Supp. 2005); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 506.010 (LexisNexis 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 152
(2006); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-201 (1995 & Supp. 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:5-1
(West 2005).
Six of these states deviate somewhat from the MPC formulation. Arkansas,
Hawaii, and Nebraska state that the offender's course of conduct must be "intended," rather than "planned," to "culminate in the offense." ARK. CODE ANN. §
5-3-201(a)(2) (2006); HAW. REV. STAT. § 705-500(1)(b) (1993 & Supp. 2005); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 28-201(1)(b) (1995 & Supp. 2005). Maine similarly requires "intent
to complete the commission of the crime." ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 152(1)
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with respect to its subsection specifying the rules for incomplete attempts.103 The status of ARH under these codes is de(2006). Hawaii and Nebraska also, along with Delaware, have no introductory
reference to an offender having "the culpability otherwise required by an offense,"
which would tend to suggest such codes rely more heavily on the provision's references to intent, making it less likely they would support ARH liability. DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 531 (2001); HAW. REV. STAT. § 705-500(1) (1993 & Supp.
2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-201(1) (1995 & Supp. 2005). Finally, Kentucky
strengthens the "substantial step" requirement to demand not only that the conduct be "strongly corroborative" of criminal purpose, but that it must "leave[ no
reasonable doubt as to the defendant's intention to commit the crime." KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 506.010(2) (LexisNexis 1999).
103.
The Code's definition of attempt is worth reproducing in its entirety:
(1) Definition of Attempt. A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a
crime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for commission of the crime, he:
(a) purposely engages in conduct which would constitute the crime
if the attendant circumstances were as he believes them to be; or
(b) when causing a particular result is an element of the crime, does
or omits to do anything with the purpose of causing or with the belief that it will cause such result without further conduct on his
part; or
(c) purposely does or omits to do anything which, under the circumstances as he believes them to be, is an act or omission constituting
a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his
commission of the crime.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1) (1985).
The Code also states, vis-a-vis section (1)(c), that "[c]onduct shall not be held
to constitute a substantial step ... unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's
criminal purpose." Id. § 5.01(2). Section (1)(c) is the subsection dealing with incomplete attempts. All general attempt provisions define the elements of this
category of attempt. In other words, the twenty states in the first category (for
example) all define attempt as performing some amount of conduct toward an offense (an "overt act," a "substantial step," or the like) while having the intent to
commit that offense.
Section (1)(a) deals with so-called "impossible" attempts, discussed briefly in
Part I.A. Only eleven states have adopted some version of (1)(a): eight of the nine
states in the second general category (all but Maine), along with Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Wyoming. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1001(A)(1) (2001 & Supp.
2006); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-3-201(a)(1) (2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
53a-49(a)(1) (West 2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 531(1) (2001); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 705-500(1)(a) (1993 & Supp. 2005); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 506.010(1)(a)
(LexisNexis 1999); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-201(1)(a) (1995 & Supp. 2005); N.J. STAT.

ANN. § 2C:5-1(a)(1) (West 2005); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 44(a) (2002); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-12-101(a)(1) (2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-301(a)(ii) (2006).
Section (1)(b) creates a separate subsection creating a specific rule for "completed" attempts: those for which the target offense demands a certain result, and
that result could occur without the attempter having to do anything further. Only
three states have adopted a version of section (1)(b) that deals exclusively with
completed attempts. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:5-1(a)(2) (West 2005); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 21, § 44(b) (2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-12-101(a)(2) (2006). Three other
states have variations of (1)(b) that switch it back into a (supplementary) rule for
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batable, as ARH's status under the Model Penal Code itself is
somewhat ambiguous.
The MPC's commentary discussing
"completed" attempts makes specific reference to the notion of
attempt liability for reckless or negligent homicide and claims
that the Code does not allow for it.104 Yet that does not fully
resolve the matter, for two reasons. First, the MPC's three
subsections provide alternative, and not mutually exclusive,
bases for attempt liability, and the codes following the MPC all
adopt the subsection dealing with incomplete attempts instead
of, or in addition to, the completed-attempt subsection. 105
Second, and far more importantly, notwithstanding the
Code's disavowal of ARH, the general scheme of its attempt
provision, as explained in detail in the commentary, does actually admit of the possibility of ARH in a limited set of circumstances. The commentary is quite clear that the Code's attempt formulation has two exceptions to the general
requirement of purpose, or intent:
[W]ith respect to the circumstances under which a crime
must be committed, the culpability otherwise required for
commission of the crime is also applicable to the attempt;
and with respect to offenses where causing a result is an
element, a belief that the result will occur without further
conduct on the actor's part will suffice. 106
One of the frustrating aspects of the Code is that it does not define the distinction between circumstances and results. A footnote in the attempt commentary offers some examples of what
each term is thought to encompass:
The "circumstances" of the offense refer to the objective
situation that the law requires to exist, in addition to the
incomplete attempts-a rule dealing specifically with the level of culpability
needed as to a result, where the target offense requires one. See ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 5-3-201(b) (2006); HAW. REV. STAT. § 705-500(2) (1993 & Supp. 1995); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 28-201(2) (1995 & Supp. 2005).
104.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 cmt. 2 at 303-05 (1985).
105.
As noted above, see supra note 103, only six states have adopted any version of MPC section (1)(b). In all other jurisdictions, completed attempts would be
prosecuted (along with incomplete ones) under the general provision defining "attempt" to demand less than the full amount of conduct needed to commit the offense. Such provisions clearly apply to complete attempts as well, as performing
all the offense conduct would ipso facto satisfy their conduct rules, which demand
something less than that.
106.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 explanatory note at 297 (1985).
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defendant's act or any results that the act may cause. The
elements of "nighttime" in burglary, "property of another" in
theft, "female not his wife" in rape, and "dwelling" in arson
are illustrations .... Results, of course, include "death" in

homicide. While these terms are not airtight categories,
they have served as a helpful analytical device in the development of the Code.107
The explanation is not crystal clear, but is certainly consistent
with the argument, advanced by Robinson and Grall, that the
most sensible reading of the distinction is to understand a result narrowly as a change caused by the actor's offense conduct,
whereas any other required characteristics of the offense situation are circumstance elements.l08
Applying these attempt rules to the Code's definition of
homicide reveals that ARH is not entirely foreclosed under the
Code.
Like many states, the Code defines homicide as
"causjing] the death of another human being."109 Reckless
homicide (which the Code calls manslaughter) is defined simply
enough, and again similarly to many states, as homicide "committed recklessly,"110 so the offense requires recklessness as to
all elements.Ill In this case, there are two elements: (1) "causing the death" (2) "of another human being."112 Under the
Code's own description, and clearly under Robinson and Grall's
analysis, the first of these elements is a result, and the second
is a circumstance.
As noted above, the Code's attempt provision would require purpose or intent as to the result element, but would allow liability based on recklessness (the culpability this offense
requires) as to the circumstance element. Thus under the
107.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 cmt. 2 at 301 n.9 (1985).
108.
See Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grall, Element Analysis in Defining Liability: The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REV. 681, 719-25 (1983).
Hardly any other work has sought to clarify the distinction between circumstances and results, and none has done so as clearly or persuasively as Robinson
and Grall. See, e.g., R.A. Duff, The Circumstances of an Attempt, 50 CAMBRIDGE
L.J. 100, 104-11 (1991) (seeking to articulate a distinction between circumstances
and results, or "consequences"); DUFF, supra note 9, at 12-14 & n.60 (noting the
difficulty of this task without offering a resolution, and describing Duff's own earlier effort as "so tortuously cumbersome that the doctrine remains impracticable").
109.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1(1) (1985).
110.
Id. § 210.3(1)(a).
111.
Cf. id. § 2.02(4) (stated culpability term applies to all elements).
112.
See ROBINSON, supra note 12, § 3.1 at 150 ("Most offense definitions include one or more circumstance elements as well, defining the precise nature ..
of a prohibited result-for example, causing the death of another human being.").
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Code's carefully crafted culpability scheme, attempt liability
would not lie where one acted while reckless as to causing
death, but ARH (or even attempted negligent homicide) would
be possible where one intended to cause death, but was reckless
(or negligent) as to whether the thing to be killed was a human
being or not. The scenario seems contrived, but some realworld cases can be described in exactly these terms.1i3 Further, as Part L.A discussed, Duff s theory of attempt would explicitly recognize the distinction the MPC embraces: imposing
liability (for ARH) where one tries to kill what may be a person,
but denying it where one risks killing what definitely is a person.114

Thus, the Model Penal Code creates a framework for attempt liability that, if applied as the Code's own commentary
describes, would recognize ARH in at least some cases-but
apparently does so accidentally, as the Code's commentary addresses the specific issue of ARH and claims to disallow it. In
addition to reinforcing this Part's claim that the law and logic
of ARH is more complicated than its usual offhand dismissal
would suggest, this anomaly of the Code again highlights the
complexity and difficulty of writing a single attempt provision
to cover all offenses and situations, and only offenses and
situations, where liability is thought appropriate. Part II of
this article explores in further detail how the ARH problem,
and its alternative solutions, raise general issues about how to
write criminal law.
The second category of state attempt provisions, those following the Model Penal Code's formulation, therefore appears
to allow for ARH. A third category of attempt provision seems
113.
See, e.g., Kate Schott, Video Recording Led to Arrest in Monroe County
Shooting, LA CROSSE (WIs.) TRIB., Sep. 28, 2005, available at http://www.lacrosse
tribune.com/articles/2005/09/28/news/OOlead.txt (hunter shoots at, and kills, person he says he thought was a squirrel; charged with reckless homicide). Whether
the Vice President's recent hunting expedition fits into this category is for the
reader to determine. See Anne E. Kornblut, Cheney Shoots Fellow Hunter in Mishap on a Texas Ranch, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2006, at Al.
114,
See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text. Neither the Code nor Duff
makes any such connection, however. As noted, the Code (which, of course, predated Duff s work) offers no justification of its scheme, much less a justification
along Duff's particular lines; the commentary offers no recognition that ARH
would arise in these or any other conditions under the Code, and even asserts that
the Code rejects ARH. For his part, Duff does not draw on the Code in advancing
his theory, or offer the reading of the Code provided here, which appears to track
his theory. As far as I am aware, no other observer has pointed to the possibility
of ARH under the Code.
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even more hospitable to ARH. The group includes four states
that simplify the MPC provision to state merely that a person
commits an attempt if, "acting with the culpability required for
commission of the crime, he engages in conduct that constitutes
a substantial step toward commission of the crime."115 This
category includes Colorado, the one state that has recognized
ARH as an offense,116 and Utah, which once hinted at a reading that would allow ARH but has since clearly rejected that
view.l17
Serious consideration of the possibility of ARH in these
states is hardly surprising, as their formulation of attempt is
clearly even friendlier to the idea of ARH liability than the
Model Penal Code's. This version does not explicitly require
purpose as to any aspect of the offense, as the Model Penal
Code does. Accordingly, it seems a strain to read such provisions as "elevating" any of the culpability requirements of the
target offense to require intent. The most natural reading is
that attempt liability may be imposed for any crime requiring
any level of culpability, so long as (1) the offender has the culpability required for that crime, and (2) the offender satisfies
the conduct requirement, i.e., takes a "substantial step" toward
the offense.118
The fourth and final category of attempt provision, with
four members, is "Other"-and appropriately enough, includes
the three states whose names start with 0 (along with Tennes-

115.
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-5-1(a) (LexisNexis 2004); see also COLO. REV.
STAT. § 18-2-101(1) (2006); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06-01 (1997) ("[A]cting with
the kind of culpability otherwise required for commission of a crime, he intentionally engages in conduct which, in fact, constitutes a substantial step toward commission of the crime."); UTAH CODE. ANN. § 76-4-101(1) (2003).
116.
See sources cited supra note 5.
117.
See State v. Maestas, 652 P.2d 903, 904 (Utah 1982) ("The above statute
makes it clear that regardless of any requirements which the common law may
impose concerning 'attempt' crimes, Utah law requires only 'the kind of culpability
otherwise required for the commission of the [completed] offense."'); State v. Vigil,
842 P.2d 843, 848 (Utah 1992) (crime of attempted depraved indifferent homicide
does not exist; noting but repudiating Maestas language, stating that 'one cannot
be guilty of an attempt to commit a crime unless the necessary mens rea of the
completed crime is intentional conduct"') (quoting State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91, 94
n.1 (Utah 1982) (emphasis added)).
118.
See, e.g., People v. Thomas, 729 P.2d 972, 975 (Colo. 1986) (en banc)
("[C]ontrary to the defendant's argument, there is no logical or legal inconsistency
involved in the recognition of attempted reckless manslaughter as a crime under
the Colorado Criminal Code."); ROBINSON, supra note 12, § 11.2 at 638 (discussing
Utah formulation and suggesting it does not require intent as to result).
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see, evidently the nonconformist even in this group).119 Ohio
and Oregon both contain codes that could be read to define culpability rules only for an offense's requisite conduct, and not for
any circumstances or results. Ohio requires that a person
"purposely or knowingly, and when purpose or knowledge is
sufficient culpability for the commission of an offense, shall engage in conduct that, if successful, would constitute or result in
the offense."120 This provision does not state a requisite level
of culpability as to any result of the actor's conduct, but merely
says the conduct itself must be engaged in "purposely or knowingly." The reference to the potential "success" of the conduct
suggests that the actor must have some intended result in
mind, but even this might allow for the possibility of ARH. For
example, if the state could show that a person's planned but
foiled bombing attempt would have killed someone "if successful," the bomber might be liable under this definition for attempted homicide even if he was only reckless as to causing
death. Oregon's provision is even more amenable to such a
reading, requiring only that a person "intentionally engages in
conduct which constitutes a substantial step toward" the offense and stating no culpability as to other elements.121 Further, Oregon dispenses with the usual requirement that the
"substantial step" must strongly corroborate the actor's criminal intent.122 Tennessee's provision, somewhat like Ohio's,
suggests a requirement of intent as to a planned course of conduct as an alternative to a requirement of intent as to a result
of that conduct per se-a view of attempt perhaps roughly similar to Paul Robinson's, discussed in Part I.A.123 The Tennessee
formulation imposes liability where the person, "acting with
the kind of culpability otherwise required for the offense...
[a]cts with intent to complete a course of action or cause a result that would constitute the offense ...

and the conduct con-

stitutes a substantial step toward the commission of the offense."124 Perhaps the "course of action" language is meant to
apply only to offenses that require no result, but the provision
is not clear about that and suggests that one could have ARH
119.
(2002);
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.02 (West 2006); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 44
OR. REV. STAT. § 161.405 (2005); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-12-101 (2006).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.02(A) (West 2006).
OR. REV. STAT. § 161.405(1) (2005).
See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(2) (1985).
See supra notes 68-69, 75-78 and accompanying text.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-12-101(a)(3) (2006) (emphasis added).
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liability based on intent to complete a course of action that involves recklessness as to killing someone.
Finally, and perhaps most unusually, Oklahoma's attempt
provision only sets out rules for completed attempts, saying
nothing about incomplete attempts.125 (As to complete attempts, purpose or knowledge is required, so ARH would not be
possible.) The only suggestion that liability will lie for incomplete attempts appears in the grading provision for attempts,
which refers to one who "attempts to commit any crime, and in
such attempt does any act toward the commission of such
crime, but fails.... ."126 This suggests that as to incomplete attempts, Oklahoma's code is like the nine codes noted above that
use, but do not explain, the term attempt.127 Yet its code does
define the term "attempt to commit a crime," but in a manner
that allows only completed attempts; reading the provisions together, the definition should limit the grading provision to
completed attempts, notwithstanding the latter's apparent desire to reach more broadly.
To summarize, at least sixteen states-the thirteen in the
second and third categories above, along with Ohio, Oregon,
and Tennessee-have attempt provisions that do not clearly
foreclose the possibility of ARH liability and can be read as
supporting it, sometimes for only a narrow set of situations,
sometimes more broadly. If these states meant to reject ARH
liability, they failed to devise statutory wording that managed
to do so clearly. This failure may indicate the difficulty of
plainly specifying the exact content of a single, broad attempt
provision that is asked to do a lot of work in defining the parameters of inchoate criminal liability. Part II considers and
evaluates the alternatives to that single-attempt-provision approach.
II. THE PROBLEMS WITH "SOLUTIONS" TO ATTEMPTED
RECKLESS HOMICIDE
All the criticism of ARH is especially curious given that
many codes define one or more other offenses that cover much
of the same conduct ARH would, if not more. As noted above,
the Model Penal Code sidesteps the seeming complexities of
125.
126.
127.

See OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 44 (2002).
Id.
See supra note 98.
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ARH by pointing out that its reckless endangerment offense
("RE") covers the same ground anyway.128 In fact, RE reaches
even further than ARH in that it includes conduct risking injury as well as conduct risking death.129
Part II.A discusses the general RE offense as a substitute
for ARH, concluding that it shares whatever problems ARH has
and might add a few new problems of its own. Part II.B discusses the alternative option-or rather, supplementary option,
as a number of states do both-of defining specific endangerment offenses dealing with conduct that might otherwise be
ARH or RE.
Rejecting ARH in favor of adopting RE or other endangerment crimes indicates a decision, or at least a willingness, to
deal with atypical varieties of criminality by writing a new offense, or multiple offenses, rather than by expanding or otherwise modifying an existing provision of general application.
Yet such a choice runs counter to the usual apparent (albeit
unstated and unjustified) preference of code writers for thin,
elegant solutions rather than one-off provisions that make a
code thick. In the end, the decision to criminalize the underlying behavior in one way rather than another, or several ways,
is a matter of form rather than substance.130 Some significant
practical consequences may attend that formal choice, however,
and the uncharacteristic favoring of thick methods over thin
methods in the ARH situation highlights the issue of when and
why a code should choose to be thick or thin, on the whole or as
to particular matters.
The balance of the article considers that issue, which
commentators have largely neglected to this point. Scholarship
generally addresses substantive questions about which acts or
actors merit punishment and which do not. The formulation of
criminal law, though, involves not only those questions, but
also drafting questions about how to craft rules that best capture the substantive decisions while avoiding any potential organizational, structural, or practical problems that might ensue from the rules' design. In short, it involves some selection

128.
See supra note 16.
129.
See infra notes 133-41 and accompanying text.
130.
To be more precise, this is true only to the extent these different crimes
entail the same punishment. Sections IIA and II.B discuss the relation between
the offense grades that attach to endangerment offenses and those that would exist for ARH if it were recognized.
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(even if made unintentionally) between a thick code, a thin
code, or some mix of the two. Part II.C addresses considerations relevant to that selection, and Part ILD criticizes the
common modern practice of piling thick provisions onto an
originally thin legal frame.
A. The General Reckless Endangerment Offense
Following the Model Penal Code's lead,131 twenty-four
states have adopted a general RE offense.132 This decision to
adopt RE and eschew ARH-solving an apparent problem that
would attend adoption of a broad general provision by adopting
a more precise provision to address the conduct in question-is
a step in the direction of what I earlier characterized as the
thick-code rather than the thin-code model.133 True, it is just
one step: the general RE offense is itself a thinner option than
other possible responses to the ARH issue, as the next section
131.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.2 (1980).
132.
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-24 (LexisNexis 2005); ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.250
(2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1201 (2001 & Supp. 2006); COLO. REV. STAT.
18-3-208 (2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-63 (West 2001) (first degree); id. §
53a-64 (second degree); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 604 (2001) (first degree); id. §
603 (2001) (second degree); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-60(b) (2004); HAw. REV. STAT. §
707-713 (1993 & Supp. 2005) (first degree); id. § 707-714 (second degree); 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/12-5 (West 2002); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-2-2(b) (LexisNexis
2004); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508.060 (LexisNexis 1999) (first degree "wanton"
endangerment; "wanton," as defined in § 501.020(3), is equivalent to standard
definition of "reckless"); id. § 508.070 (second degree); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
17-A, § 211 (2006); id. § 213 (aggravated version); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3204 (LexisNexis 2002); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 631:3 (1996 & Supp. 2006); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 120.20 (McKinney 2004) (second degree); id. § 120.25 (first degree);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-03 (1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.195 (2005); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2705 (West 1998 & Supp. 2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13103 (2006); TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.05(a) (Vernon 2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5112 (2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1025 (1998 & Supp. 2006); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 9A.36.050 (West 2000); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-504 (2006).
Two other states have not adopted reckless endangerment only because they
do not recognize "recklessness" as a distinct culpability level; they have instead
adopted a negligent-endangerment offense. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.05(1)
(2000) (defining offense for "[w]hoever, through culpable negligence, exposes another person to personal injury"; code does not define "culpable negligence");
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-208 (2005) (defining offense of "negligently... creat[ing]
a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury"; negligence is defined in § 452-101(42) to embrace usual concepts of recklessness and negligence together).
133.
Cf. Green, supra note 20, at 336 (noting that "reckless endangerment, assault, and involuntary manslaughter [i.e., reckless homicide] all involve essentially the same conduct" and "differ only in the kind of harm caused," creating
possibility of "redundancy-reducing consolidation of offenses").
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discusses.134 Moreover, the Model Penal Code drafters' purpose in creating RE was not only to resolve the ARH issue by
other means, but also (in keeping with the Code's usual thin
preferences) to consolidate other, more particular offenses
sharing the common feature of endangerment.135 Even so,
relative to ARH, RE represents an acknowledgement that
broad general-part solutions or single offense provisions, such
as attempt, may not be able to cover all bases and that a code
therefore will sometimes need to adopt additional specific offenses to deal with specific problems.
What does RE look like, and how does it compare to ARH?
The most common version of the offense, adopted in ten
states,136 prohibits creating a "substantial risk" (or "danger") of
"serious" injury to another person. Two states require only a
risk of serious injury,137 five require a substantial risk of any
injury,138 and two require only a risk of any injury.139 Finally,
134.
See infra Part II.B. Douglas Husak seems to favor the general RE offense
as a relatively thin solution, preferable to the much thicker option of a multitude
of "simple inchoate" offenses targeting specific conduct. See Husak, supra note 21,
at 621-23. What he really seems to call for, though, is a broad residual or secondary offense that, like a general attempt provision, is not self-contained but piggybacks on other provisions. He says that unlike the MPC's RE offense, "the alternative I describe would require only substantial endangerment; it need not
involve [a risk of?] serious bodily injury." Id. at 622 n.79. But of course, if the offense would not refer specifically to a risk of serious bodily injury, some content is
needed for the kinds of "endangerment" it would address. Presumably that content would be supplied by looking to the primary harms the criminal law recognizes and specifies in other offenses, and taking the endangerment offense to proscribe any sufficient risk of any of those harms.
135.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.2 cmt. 1 at 196 (1980) ('CThe Model Code
proposes to replace the haphazard coverage of prior law with one comprehensive
provision."); id. at 198 ("The purpose of this section is ... to give systematic
statement to the ad hoc provisions of prior law and to achieve uniformity of grading."). But cf. id. at 198-99 (comparing RE's punishment of inchoate conduct toward criminal harm to attempt provision, which operates in similar fashion).
136.
Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Maine, Maryland, New York, Oregon, Texas
("imminent danger"), Utah, and Washington. For citations to the relevant statutory provisions, see supra note 132. Some states' formulations refer to a risk of
serious injury or death, but this added language is not relevant, as serious injury
is typically defined to include death. New York aggravates the offense if one creates a "grave risk of death" while acting with depraved indifference. Id. As to
Maine's RE scheme, see also infra note 140.
137.
Hawaii and Wyoming, both of which refer to "placing in danger" of death
or serious injury. For citations to the relevant statutory provisions, see supra
note 132.
138.
Arizona, Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, and Kentucky. For citations to the
relevant statutory provisions, see supra note 132. Georgia refers to "endangering
bodily safety." Id. Arizona and Delaware aggravate the offense for creating a
substantial risk of death (Arizona refers to "imminent" death), and Kentucky ag-
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five states follow the Model Penal Code's language by not demanding actual endangerment of another person, instead referring to conduct that places "or may place" another in danger
of serious injury.140
The RE offense is even broader than an ARH offense would
be, at least with respect to the level of harm that must be
risked: for RE, only injury or serious injury, whereas ARH
would require a risk of death. Whether RE is more or less demanding than ARH would be with respect to the magnitude of
the risk, as opposed to the magnitude of harm risked, is less
clear, in part because ARH would orient itself toward the actor's conduct and not necessarily toward the objective risk the
conduct creates. As to that aspect of the offenses' objective requirements, there would certainly be considerable overlap, especially for most cases that would arise as a practical matter.
Still, at least in the abstract, it is possible that each offense
would include some cases the other would not. On one hand,
behavior that creates a risk but is fairly preliminary in the
chain of conduct leading toward causing a death might be RE
but not ARH. On the other hand, a course of conduct that is
likely to culminate in a death, and that has advanced quite far,
even without yet creating an objective likelihood of death absent further action, might be ARH but not RE.
Notably, both RE and ARH rely on an underlying definition of recklessness that typically demands conscious disregard
of a "substantial risk."141 Yet this requirement arguably
speaks only to the level of subjective risk-that is, the amount
of risk the actor perceives to exist-rather than the objective

gravates the offense for creating a substantial risk of serious injury while acting
with depraved indifference. Id.
139.
Connecticut and Illinois. For citations to the relevant statutory provisions, see supra note 132. Connecticut has a higher degree of the offense for creating a risk of serious injury while acting with depraved indifference. Illinois refers
to "endangering bodily safety." Id.
140.
New Hampshire, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Tennessee ("places or may
place another in imminent danger"), and Vermont. For citations to the relevant
statutory provisions, see supra note 132. North Dakota's formulation refers to
"substantial risk," but then adds that "there is risk if the potential for harm exists, whether or not a person's safety is actually jeopardized." Id. In addition,
Maine's RE offense refers to conduct that "creates a substantial risk," but its aggravated form of the offense refers to conduct that "in fact creates a substantial
risk," which implies that the standard offense somehow does not require risk "in
fact." ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 211 (2006); id. § 213 (aggravated version).
141.
See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1980).
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level of risk that does exist in the situation.142 Hence the
variation of different RE formulations, some requiring substantial risk and some requiring only risk, has genuine significance,
and an offense requiring only creation of a "risk" is not inconsistent with a definition of recklessness requiring conscious
disregard of a "substantial risk." In such a case, the subjective
risk the person recognizes and ignores must be substantial, but
the objective risk the person actually creates need not be. This
distinction is hardly obvious, however, and highlights one difficulty with RE: its frequent failure to make clear the extent to
which it is meant to address subjective versus objective risk.
The problems with RE do not end there. The RE "solution"
to the ARH puzzle does not eliminate the conceptual and practical difficulties with ARH, but replicates them, and may even
exacerbate them. Although academic commentary has given
little attention to these difficulties as they bear on RE directly,
the actual experience in the states makes clear that lawenforcement authorities and the courts have struggled with the
ambiguity of RE at least as much as they would with ARH.
For example, RE is subject to what we might call the
count-counting problem: when a single act endangers (or might
endanger) multiple people, how many counts of RE may the offender be charged with?143 Only one, because there was only
one act? One count per person actually endangered? One
count for each person for whom a risk of harm was recognized
and disregarded by the offender? One count for each person
the actor might reasonably have expected to be there? Criminal theory has offered no clear solution to these questions.
Existing criminal law, on the other hand, offers several dif-

142.
See Paul H. Robinson, Prohibited Risks and Culpable Disregard or Inattentiveness: Challenge and Confusion in the Formulation of Risk-Creation Offenses, 4 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 367 (2003). For a contrary view-asserting that
objective risk does not exist or necessarily collapses into an examination of subjective risk assessment-see Larry Alexander, Insufficient Concern: A Unified Conception of Criminal Culpability, 88 CAL. L. REV. 931 (2000); LARRY ALEXANDER,
KIMBERLY FERZAN & STEPHEN J. MORSE, A SUBJECTIVE THEORY OF CRIMINAL
LAW ch. 2 (Cambridge, forthcoming 2008) (excerpt on file with author).
143.
This problem is not unique to RE; as I have noted before, the issue of
when to allow liability for multiple crimes (or multiple counts of the same crime)
for a single act or course of conduct is a pervasive and thorny one. See Michael T.
Cahill, Offense Gradingand Multiple Liability: New Challenges for a Model Penal
Code Second, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 599, 604-07 (2004). RE, however, provides
an especially difficult, and heretofore largely unexplored, set of questions on this
score.
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ferent and in some cases contradictory solutions, often without
offering any supporting reasoning to justify the solution chosen. Appellate case law directly dealing with the scope of RE is
scant, perhaps because the offense often does not carry enough
punishment to make appellate litigation worth either party's
while.144 Only a few states have tackled, much less resolved,
the count-counting problem. A New York appellate court has
recently said that RE "can be committed whether the conduct is
directed at one person or a group of persons, but in either
event, only one crime is committed because it is the actor's
conduct and not the number of persons affected (i.e., the particular outcome) that sustains the prosecution[.]"145 A Tennessee case hinted at a similar rule,146 but refused to commit to
it,147 and subsequent unpublished decisions have retreated
from the position, recognizing the possibility of multiple counts
for multiple "acts" during a single course of conduct.148 Other
states, without squarely facing the question, have affirmed
without comment convictions on multiple counts whose basis
was not multiple acts, but the presence of multiple "victims."149
A look at the offense-charging practices of law-enforcement officials reveals similar indeterminacy as to whether the number
of counts depends on the conduct, such as the number of shots
fired, or the situation, such as the number of people present

144.
See infra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
145.
People v. Stockholm, 719 N.Y.S.2d 330, 331 (N.Y. App. 2001) (citing People v. Davis, 526 N.E.2d 20 (N.Y. 1988) (emphasis in original)).
146.
See State v. Ramsey, 903 S.W.2d 709, 713 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) ("[T]he
reckless conduct engaged in by the defendant was one continuous act, a single
course of conduct, and therefore supports only one conviction for that act....
[A]lthough the defendant's reckless conduct victimized more than one person, it
does not justify multiple convictions.").
147.
See id. ('We need not fashion a blanket rule that provides that a defendant's continuous operation of a vehicle may only result in one act of reckless endangerment under the statute. Many scenarios could be created where such a
rule would not be prudent.").
148.
See English v. State, 2004 WL 57089, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004) (remanding for finding whether defendant's "pointing the gun at the children occurred at separate times, with a sufficient interval in between to support to separate counts of reckless endangerment"); State v. Kennedy, 1997 WL 137426, at
*2-*3 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (stating that between veering into traffic and running red light two blocks later, defendant "had time to form the necessary criminal intent [sic] to commit the second act of reckless endangerment," so that two
convictions on two counts could stand).
149.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Huggins, 836 A.2d 862, 864 (Pa. 2003) (noting
without comment that driver who fell asleep had been charged with 23 counts of
RE based on number of people in van at the time).
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when shots are fired.150
The confusion in the states is hardly surprising, as it
tracks a basic failure to define RE's scope clearly at the outset.151 Most fundamentally, RE does not avoid, either in its
theoretical conception or its legal implementation, the critical
question of what we seek to address with inchoate offenses, and
with criminal law more generally: personal culpability or objective harm. It is certainly possible to characterize RE as capturing some real or threatened harm. Indeed, such a harm can be
conceived in several different ways, and it is hardly clear which

150.
For example, the Washington Post's crime reports relate various cases of
police charging offenders with multiple counts of reckless endangerment, apparently based on different considerations in different cases. Compare Jonathan
Abel, Woman Charged in House Fire, WASH. POST, July 28, 2005, at T07 (woman
charged with four counts of RE for setting fire to house with four other people in
it); Anne Arundel County, WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 2004, at T21 (man charged with six
counts of RE for pointing gun at "a group of people"); Anne Arundel Crime Watch,
WASH. POST, June 2, 2005, at T16 (man charged with four counts of RE for firing
two shots that endangered four people); Anne Arundel Crime Watch, WASH. POST,
Dec. 11, 2003, at T08 (man charged with two counts of RE for firing gun once near
two roommates); Crime and Justice, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 2005, at B02 (student
charged with 20 counts of RE for setting fire to Halloween decorations on classroom door at high school, where room had 20 students in it); Crime and Justice,
WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2000, at B02 (man charged with three counts of RE for
pointing rifle at three people); Montgomery County Crime Watch, WASH. POST,
Aug. 16, 2001, at T15 (man charged with four counts of RE for threatening four
people with gun); Boy Charged in Death of Friend,WASH. POST, July 22, 2000, at
B05 (15-year-old charged with three counts of RE for firing gun once near three
people); Maureen O'Hagan, Trial Scheduled for Man Charged in Poisoning Case;
Chemist Allegedly Poured Mercury in Former Co-Worker's Car, WASH. POST, Aug.
30, 2001, at T03 (man charged with three counts of RE for pouring mercury in car,
where family owning car had three members); with Anne Arundel Crime Watch,
WASH. POST, May 27, 2004, at T14 (man charged with two counts of RE for firing
gun twice after pointing it "at several people"); Man Charged in Firing of Gunshots at Refuge, WASH. POST, Sep. 14, 2000, at M04 (man charged with eight
counts of RE for firing multiple shots in wetlands refuge; no indication of any others present), and with Montgomery Crime Watch, WASH. POST, June 19, 2003, at
T24 (man charged with one count of RE for throwing multiple rocks from hotel
roof onto two police officers); and with Montgomery County Crime Watch, WASH.
POST, Apr. 26, 2001, at T21 (man charged with four counts of RE for firing two
shots at two women, missing and hitting two apartment windows instead).
Two additional facts are worth noting about these cases. First, in nearly all
of them, the offender was charged with various counts of homicide, attempt, assault, weapons possession, and/or other crimes in addition to the count(s) of RE.
Second, these cases arose in Maryland, where each count of RE carries an unusually high five-year maximum penalty. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-204(b)
(LexisNexis 2002).
151.
The Model Penal Code's commentary devotes less than a page to explaining the meaning and boundaries of the RE offense itself, largely recapitulating the
offense's language. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.2 cmt. 3 at 203 (1980).
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of these possible harms, if any, the RE offense is meant to address. One possibility is that exposure to risk creates psychological harm, based on a sense that being near the path of a
gunshot or out-of-control car causes mental trauma even if not
physical injury. But what if the "victim" never knows she was
placed in jeopardy? Indeed, should RE even demand a "victim,"
or is it better to conceive it, as some states do, as requiring only
conduct that places "or may place" someone in danger?152 Another view is that the risk itself is a harm.153 In that case too,
presumably there must be some person actually "suffering" the
risk, and thus the harm the risk represents. Further, if risk is
a harm, as more people are subjected to the risk, more people
experience the harm, suggesting that a single act endangering
multiple people might give rise to multiple counts of RE.
The difficulty of identifying or characterizing the harm
with which the RE offense is concerned might make RE even
more problematic in this regard than the ARH alternative. If
the offense were overtly conceived as an attempted homicide offense, it would be easier to draw on solutions to the countcounting problem that broadly apply to homicide, or even other
attempted crimes, in other contexts. If the jurisdiction's general rule is that other forms of attempted homicide, such as attempted murder, require only one actual would-be "victim,"
then that rule could be applied in the ARH context as well.
The appropriateness of applying any such rule to the RE offense, on the other hand, is less clear, as the RE formulation
does not clearly resemble the formulation of homicide offenses,
or even assault offenses.
Of course, even if attempt doctrine points to answers here,
152.
See supra notes 132, 140 and sources cited therein.
153.
Compare Claire Finkelstein, Is Risk a Harm?, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 963
(2003) (arguing that risk is a harm), with Matthew D. Adler, Risk, Death and
Harm: The Normative Foundations of Risk Regulation, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1293,
1444 (2003) ('My Article does not resolve the criminal or tort law status of risk
imposition.... [But it shows] that one important argument in favor of liabilitythe argument that risking is itself a kind of consequential harming-must be
abandoned.").
On the risk-is-a-harm view, RE-and presumably attempt as a general matter-are no longer inchoate offenses, but offenses that generate their own harm.
Finkelstein points out that describing risk as a harm does not itself suggest any
opinion as to whether we should criminalize the creation of that harm. See
Finkelstein, supra at 965-66. For present purposes, though, the risk-as-harm notion is significant precisely because RE does exist as a crime and this view provides one possible explanation or justification of the purpose and proper scope of
that crime.
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it might not point to good answers, so it is entirely possible
that using ARH rather than RE would not resolve the problem
in a satisfying way. In the end, it may be no simpler to make
conceptual sense of ARH with respect to the count-counting
problem than it is for RE. But that is the point: RE and ARH
essentially cover the same ground and give rise to similar conceptual conundrums, so the view that RE "solves" the ARH
puzzle is mistaken.
RE is also no clearer than ARH would be with respect to its
minimum conduct requirement, that is, the point in a course of
conduct when otherwise non-criminal behavior becomes sufficiently proximate to potential harm for liability to arise. A requirement of conduct that "places or may place another in danger" of a harm is not obviously more helpful or accurate or easy
to implement than demanding a "substantial step" (or the like)
in the direction of causing the same harm. At what point has
an actor moved far enough in the direction of placing another
in jeopardy that criminal liability should attach? The answer,
if any ex ante answer is possible, seems no clearer in the RE
context than in the ARH context.
RE, then, gives rise to conceptual and practical difficulties
that either duplicate the difficulties of ARH or seem at least
comparably problematic. Further, adopting a specific offense of
RE rather than using a general attempt provision introduces
the risk of incoherence in the law's conceptual approach to
crime. A general attempt formulation, whatever its approach,
applies across the board. Using RE instead of, or in addition
to, attempt creates the possibility of inconsistency or redundancy.
One might offer, as R.A. Duff has, an account that identifies a categorical difference between endangerment offenses
and attempts.154 Such an account could justify creating distinct offenses or groups of offenses covering each of the two
categories. Even if correct, such a theory would seem to suggest parallel approaches to the two categories: for example,
having a single "endangerment" provision in a code's general
part that, like the attempt provision, piggybacks on other defined crimes rather than defining a specific independent crime
for one kind of endangerment only. It does not quite explain
why attempt is the kind of inchoate crime demanding a broad

154.

See generally Duff, supra note 52.
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general-part provision while endangerment is the kind of inchoate crime for which a more specific offense is appropriate.155
Further, while such an account might justify the existence
of RE, it would not justify an RE offense that substitutes for or
replaces ARH. As noted earlier, Duffs own view conceives of
the possibility of some form of reckless "attacks" or attempts as
well as reckless endangerments.156 His theory does not suggest that we can solve the ARH dilemma by adopting RE instead; rather, it suggests that both ARH and RE may be necessary to deal with different situations.
A final potential problem with RE relative to ARH is its
breadth: whereas attempts can vary in grade based on the
harm of the target offense (injury versus serious injury versus
death), the standard RE formulation defines a single offense
covering any risk of injury up to and including death. Some jurisdictions, though, have at least addressed this concern by enacting multiple levels of RE that distinguish between different
potential harms and, sometimes, different magnitudes of risk.
For example, three states (Arizona, Delaware, and New York)
have an aggravated RE offense covering risk of death as opposed to risk of injury.157 This idea of developing several different flavors of RE to deal with different, narrower categories
of behavior suggests a somewhat different approach from either ARH or RE: namely, the possibility of defining many targeted offenses to deal with various different kinds of risky conduct instead of having one broader provision or offense covering
any conduct risking a certain harm. The next section discusses
that approach.
B. Specific Endangerment Offenses
Another way to criminalize the substance of ARH without
recognizing the ARH offense is to define a series of specific endangerment offenses instead of a single RE offense. This
method has been pursued in the UK and elsewhere.158
155.
See id. at 57-59 (noting various issues relating to adoption of endangerment offenses, and concluding that "[s]uch considerations do not tell us just how
general or specific, in which ways, our endangerment laws should be, and do not
rule out a 'reckless endangerment' offense as general as that defined by ... the
Model Penal Code ....").
156.
See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
157.
See supra note 132 (citing statutory provisions).
158.
See David Lanham, Danger Down Under, 1999 CRIM. L. REV. 960 ("The
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Many American jurisdictions adopt both RE and more specific endangerment offenses, in part because RE alone may not
seem sufficient to address some forms of dangerous conduct.
Perhaps because the boundaries of RE are so nebulous, its punitive bite tends to be fairly weak. Most American jurisdictions
grade RE as a high misdemeanor or very low-level felony.
(Foreign jurisdictions, interestingly, are more willing to make
much higher sentences available for RE.159) As a practical
matter, then, enforcement of the RE offense is unlikely to be as
worthwhile or effective as the relative gravity of at least some
dangerous behavior might warrant. (Perhaps significantly, in
most states that currently define both a reckless-homicide offense and RE, the offense grade for ARH, if it were recognized,
would be higher than the current grade for RE. Generally
speaking, ARH would be a mid-level felony.160) The shapeEnglish approach [to endangerment] was, and is, to create a number of specific
offences of endangerment, limited to endangerment by specific means or in specific circumstances ...").
159.
See id. at 961, 964-65 (citing general RE offenses in Australian jurisdictions: in Victoria and Northern Territory, maximum penalty of 5 years for risk of
serious injury, 10 years for risk of death; in South Australia, up to 15 years for
risk of death; under Model Criminal Code, up to 10 years for risk of death, or up
to 13 years if aggravating circumstances present).
160.
Twenty-one states define offenses for both reckless homicide and RE. For
twelve of those states-including Colorado, which does recognize ARH-the grade
that would exist for ARH is two or more offense grades above the existing grade
for RE. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-104(2) (2006) (reckless homicide; Class
4 felony); id. § 18-2-101(4) (attempt to commit Class 4 felony is Class 5 felony); id.
§ 18-3-208 (RE; Class 3 misdemeanor); id. § 18-1-105(1)(a)(V)(A) (presumptive
sentence range for Class 5 felony is 1-3 years); id. § 18-1-106(1) (Class 3 misdemeanor punishable by up to six months). See also TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.04
(Vernon 2003) (reckless homicide; second-degree felony); id. § 15.01(d) (attempt to
commit second-degree felony is third-degree felony); id. § 22.05(e) (RE; Class A
misdemeanor); id. § 12.21 (Class A misdemeanor punishable by up to one year);
id. § 12.34(a) (third-degree felony punishable by 2-10 years).
In New York and Illinois, the grades would be the same. See N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 125.15 (McKinney 2004) (reckless homicide; Class C felony); id. § 110.05(5) (attempt to commit Class C felony is Class D felony); id. § 120.25 (first-degree RE,
requiring creation of "grave risk of death" while acting with extreme indifference;
Class D felony); see also 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-3(d) (West 2002) (reckless homicide; Class 3 felony); id. at 5/8-4(c)(5) (attempt to commit Class 3 felony is Class A
misdemeanor); id. at 5/12-5(b) (RE; Class A misdemeanor).
Kentucky is the only state for which the grade of RE (in this case, first-degree
RE) would exceed that for ARH. See KY. REV. STAT. § 507.040(2) (LexisNexis
1999) (reckless homicide; Class C felony); id. § 506.010(4)(d) (attempt to commit
Class C felony is Class A misdemeanor); id. § 508.060 (first-degree RE, requiring
creation of "substantial danger of death or serious physical injury" while acting
with extreme indifference; Class D felony); id. § 532.060(2)(d) (Class D felony punishable by 1-5 years); id. § 532.090(1) (Class A misdemeanor punishable by up to
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lessness of the offense's definition might make it more difficult
for prosecutors to obtain convictions, or to predict with confidence that a conviction would be forthcoming if a case went to
trial; the relatively light available sanctions limit the potency
of any convictions that are obtained.
The potential weaknesses, limitations, and ambiguities of
the RE offense do not appear to be lost on legislatures. Perhaps because of the failings of the RE offense in terms of
achieving punishment, or achieving enough punishment, many
jurisdictions with general RE offenses also have numerous
more specific offenses addressing particular forms of endangerment, and often grade those offenses more seriously than
RE itself.
Here are a handful of examples of such offenses, by no
means exhaustive.161 Several states define offenses for shooting a firearm at a building or car,162 or generally for handling
1 year).
161.
To consider just one state, Illinois has a general RE offense to which it
adds numerous offenses covering specific types of behavior risking injury or death,
often with far more serious penalties. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-2.5
(West 2002) (causing "an object to fall from an overpass in the direction of a moving motor vehicle traveling upon any highway"; Class 2 felony); id. at 5/12-4.5
(tampering with food, drugs, or cosmetics; Class 2 felony); id. at 5/12-4.8 (possessing infected domestic animals; petty offense); id. at 5/12-4.9 (inducing or encouraging a child athlete to ingest a drug designed for quick weight gain or loss; Class
A misdemeanor, Class 4 felony for repeat offense); id. at 5/12-5.1 (permitting residential real estate to deteriorate; Class A misdemeanor, Class 4 felony for repeat
offense); id. at 5/12-5.5 ("gross carelessness or neglect" in operating a steamboat
or other public conveyance; Class 4 felony); id. at 5/12-21.6 ("willfully" permitting
a child to be endangered; Class A misdemeanor, Class 3 felony for repeat offense);
id. at 120/5, 120/10 (hazing; Class A misdemeanor).
In addition to the above offenses, Illinois also has various firearm-discharge
offenses of the type the text discusses for other states. See, e.g., id. at 5/24-1.2
(grading knowingly discharging any type of firearm in the direction of a building
or vehicle one "reasonably should know to be occupied" as a Class 1 felony, but
aggravating the offense to a Class X felony where the offense occurs near a school,
and to a Class X felony with a minimum imprisonment term of ten years where
the firearm is discharged in the direction of certain categories of person, such as
peace officers, emergency medical technicians, and teachers); id. at 5/24-1.2-5
(similar to 5/24-1.2, but only applies to "machine guns" and guns equipped with
silencers; grades discharging such a firearm in the direction of an ordinary person
as a Class X felony, and aggravates the offense to a Class X felony with a minimum term of 12 years where the firearm is discharged in the direction of certain
persons, as noted above).
162.
See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1211 (2001) (Class 2 felony for "knowingly
discharg[ing] a firearm at a residential structure"; Class 3 felony for nonresidential structure); TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.05(b) (Vernon 2003) ("knowingly discharg[ing] a firearm at or in the direction of ... a habitation, building, or vehicle
[while] reckless as to whether the habitation, building, or vehicle is occupied").
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or shooting a firearm recklessly or negligently,163 or both.164

Washington defines a separate offense for "drive-by shooting,"165 while limiting its RE offense to cover only risky conduct
"not amounting to a drive-by shooting."166 (Interestingly, a few
states, following the Model Penal Code, deal with reckless gun
use by creating a presumption for purposes of the RE offense,
rather than by defining an entirely separate additional
crime.167) Several states also address the specific risk of HIV
transmission. 168 Perhaps the most curious example is New
163.
See MINN. STAT. § 609.66(1) (West 2003) (recklessly handling or using a
firearm, weapon, or explosive so as to endanger safety); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.256.1(A) (2004) ("It shall be unlawful for any person to handle recklessly any firearm so as to endanger the life, limb or property of any person."); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 61-7-12 (LexisNexis 2005) ("Any person who wantonly performs any act
with a firearm which creates a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to
another shall be guilty of a felony...."); cf. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-333 (2005)
(reckless or malicious use of explosives; misdemeanor).
164.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 246 (West 1999) ("maliciously and willfully discharg[ing] a firearm at an inhabited dwelling house, occupied building, occupied
motor vehicle, occupied aircraft, inhabited housecar ... or inhabited camper" is
felony punishable by "three, five, or seven years"); id. § 246.3 ("willfully discharg[ing] a firearm in a grossly negligent manner which could result in injury or
death to a person" punishable by up to one year). Notice that the more general
offense (§ 246.3) clearly captures the conduct the more specific offense addresses-and also directly refers to some creation of an actual risk to a person,
and hints at some culpability requirement as to that risk, which the specific one
does not quite do-yet the punishment for the general offense is significantly
lower.
165.
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.045 (West 2000) (originally called "reckless endangerment in the first degree").
166.
Id. § 9A.36.050(1).
167.
See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.05(c) (Vernon 2003) ("Recklessness and danger
are presumed if the actor knowingly pointed a firearm at or in the direction of another whether or not the actor believed the firearm to be loaded."); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 13, § 1025 (1998 & Supp. 2006) ("Recklessness and danger shall be presumed
where a person knowingly points a firearm at or in the direction of another,
whether or not the actor believed the firearm to be loaded, and whether or not the
firearm actually was loaded."); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-504(b) (2006) (RE offense is
committed, not just presumed, if one "knowingly points a firearm at or in the direction of another, whether or not the person believes the firearm to be loaded");
see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.2 (1980) ("Recklessness and danger shall be
presumed where a person knowingly points a firearm at or in the direction of another, whether or not the actor believed the firearm to be loaded."). As noted
above, see supra note 162, in addition to this presumption, Texas defines an offense for shooting at a person, building, or vehicle.
168.
See, e.g., GA. CODE. ANN. § 16-5-60(c) (2004) (authorizing up to ten-year
sentence for person who knows s/he is "HIV infected" knowingly engaging in a sex
act, sharing a needle, or donating blood without disclosing HIV status); id. § 16-560(d) (authorizing up to twenty-year sentence for person who knows s/he is "HIV
infected" or "hepatitis infected" assaulting police or corrections officer "using his
or her bodily fluids [or] saliva, urine, or feces" with intent to transmit HIV or
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Jersey, which has no general RE offense, but treats knowingly
pointing a firearm at another as aggravated assault, 169 and
also has an offense entitled "reckless endangerment" that covers only such particulars as "any act ...

which results in the

loss or destruction of a vessel"170 or "manufactur[ing] or
sell[ing] a golf ball containing acid or corrosive fluid substance."171

RE's breadth, possible ambiguity, and possibly inadequate
punishment grade, then, lead legislatures to compensate by
adopting more specific offenses that ban particular forms of especially (or obviously) dangerous behavior, often with aggravated punishment relative to the basic RE offense. The inclusion of these more specific offenses, however, itself generates at
least four significant problems.
First, to avoid the possible vagueness or ambiguity of a
broad ARH or RE offense, these offenses clearly identify the
prohibited conduct, but they often do so by only specifying the
conduct and not identifying the actual risk or harm the offense
seeks to prevent. As Douglas Husak has argued, by referring
only to conduct and not to the threat or harm that justifies
criminalizing the conduct, such offenses, although seemingly
precise, will be overinclusive, as they will invariably reach instances of the prohibited conduct that are perfectly reasonable.172
A second, and related, problem is that defining the crime
in terms of the conduct itself, rather than in relation to the ultimate harm with which the law is concerned (here, causing injury or death) means that the offense may not explicitly de-

hepatitis).
169.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-1(b)(4) (West 2005). The apparent anomaly of
defining inchoate conduct as aggravated assault is explained by New Jersey's
general equation of attempts with completed crimes. See, e.g., id. § 2C:12-1(b)(1)
(aggravated assault occurs if one "attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury" with requisite culpability).
170.
Id. § 2C:12-2(a).
171.
Id. § 2C:12-2(b)(1). One cannot help but wonder which member of the
New Jersey legislature made the mistake of buying an acid-filled golf ball.
172.
See Husak, supra note 21, at 605 ("The issue [of overbreadth] becomes especially significant in the context of these offenses [i.e., specific rather than general inchoate offenses], as criminal liability inevitably is imposed on persons
whose behavior is reasonable."). But cf. Duff, supra note 52, at 59-62 (offering
considerations in favor of 'implicit' endangerment offenses that do not specify the
ultimate harm or risk involved in the prohibited conduct, and thus may be committed where no risk arises).
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mand any level of culpability as to that harm.173 Effectively,
culpability as to other specified facts, typically conduct and circumstances-knowing one is firing a gun, knowing one is near
a building or vehicle-is used to create an irrebuttable presumption of culpability as to the law's genuine concern, the risk
of resulting harm.174

Third, the new offenses inevitably create various grading
inconsistencies and problems, both with each other and with
broader offenses such as RE and attempt.175 As a code includes more, and more refined, distinctions in its offense definitions, it becomes harder to make those distinctions meaningful
by placing the different offenses into different punishment
categories, without in turn adopting an unwieldy number of
categories. To put it differently, it may be easy to specify offense conduct with precision, but one will not necessarily be
able to specify the proper offense punishment with parallel
precision-a narrowly defined form of conduct may merit very
different punishments in different circumstances.
Fourth, the existence of numerous offenses, some of which
might apply to the same conduct, gives rise to the possibility of
improperly imposing liability for multiple offenses all of which
address the same underlying harm or risk.176 As I have noted
elsewhere, double-jeopardy rules for included offenses are far

too lenient, and unclear, to effectively or predictably police this
multiple-liability problem.177 For example, although authority
173.
Cf. Michaels, supra note 24, at 73-74 ("[D]escriptive standards risk failure
if they do not describe or at least make an excellent proxy for the judgments of
blameworthiness that underlie the offense. If facts that a standard designates as
determinative of liability do not reflect the determinants of culpability, the descriptive standard will, from a blameworthiness perspective, be significantly underinclusive, overinclusive or both and, at least in some cases, will produce bad
results.").
174.
Felony murder can be seen in this way. It eliminates any requirement of
culpability as to causing death, substituting a conduct requirement (committing
the underlying felony) that categorically and irrebuttably imputes the otherwise
required culpability. See ROBINSON & CAHILL, supra note 25, at 65-69.
175.
See Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, The Accelerating Degradation
of American Criminal Codes, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 633, 643-44 (2005) (offering examples, from Illinois law, of specific endangerment offenses whose grading is inconsistent with general endangerment offense).
176.
Cf. Green, supra note 20, at 335 ("Redundancy occurs when the same conduct is covered by more than one provision of the code .... Such duplication is
problematic in at least three ways: it is confusing, it may lead to unfair multiple
prosecutions and the potential for double jeopardy problems, and it is structurally
inelegant.").
177.
See Cahill, supra note 143, at 605.
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varies depending on the jurisdiction and exact nature of the offenses,178 endangerment offenses are not always treated as included offenses of murder or even attempted murder. 179 As offenses proliferate, even if they are written with relative
precision and specificity, it becomes increasingly likely that
multiple offenses will address the same conduct without either
being an included offense of the other, giving rise to the potential for excessive punishment, or at the very least, giving prosecutors a significant bargaining chip enabling more favorable
plea bargains. 180
C. Thin Codes and Thick Codes
Given all the problems endangerment offenses generate,
one might wonder why an exception was made here to the general rule of having the attempt provision address inchoate offenses-or, having been made here, why similar exceptions
178.
See State v. Rumbawa, 17 P.3d 862, 866 (Haw. Ct. App. 2001) ("Thus having the same end result and with a lesser degree of culpability in reckless endangering as compared to attempted murder, reckless endangering in the second degree is a lesser included offense of attempted murder ... ").
179.
See State v. Palmer, 513 A.2d 738, 742 (Conn. App. 1986) ("It is possible to
commit the crime of attempted murder under our penal code without first committing the crime of reckless endangerment in the first degree. The trial court,
therefore, correctly refused to charge that reckless endangerment in the first degree was a lesser included offense of the principal charge of attempted murder alleged in the two counts of the information against the defendant."); People v.
Serrano, 697 N.Y.S.2d 814, 818 (N.Y. Sup. 1999) ("Reckless Endangerment in the
First Degree is not a lesser included offense of Attempted Murder in the Second
Degree since it is possible to commit the latter without necessarily committing the
former."); State v. Keller, 695 N.W.2d 703, 714 (N.D. 2005) ("Thus, a person can
be convicted of attempted murder for having taken a substantial step toward commission of the crime of murder even if there never was, in fact, a substantial risk
of serious bodily injury or death to another as required for reckless endangerment.
Therefore, reckless endangerment is not a lesser included offense of attempted
murder."); State v. Newbern, 975 P.2d 1041, 1046 (Wash. App. 1999) ("Although
we find no Washington case holding that reckless endangerment is a lesser included offense of attempted murder, courts in other jurisdictions have determined
that it is not because it is possible to attempt a murder without creating a risk to
human life that rises to reckless endangerment .... We agree with these cases.");
cf. State v. Rush, 50 S.W.3d 424, 426 (Tenn. 2001) ("[W]e conclude that neither
reckless aggravated assault nor felony reckless endangerment are lesser-included
offenses of attempted second degree murder. We conclude, however, that the offense of misdemeanor reckless endangerment is a lesser-included offense of attempted second degree murder ... ").
180.
It is, of course, entirely possible that such duplicative offenses are intended to strengthen prosecutors' hand in this way. Cf. infra note 233 and accompanying text (discussing tendency of thick code to empower prosecutors).
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were not made elsewhere as well, or why the general rule is the
general rule in the first place. At least some of the arguments
against ARH, after all, seem to be general arguments against
the idea of "attempt" as a blanket category, if not necessarily
against the idea of inchoate liability itself.
That is to say, RE seems no better or worse than various
other offenses that could be used to reduce reliance on the general attempt provision or even replace that provision altogether. If RE is preferred to ARH, why is "attempted murder"
preferred to some equivalent specific offense such as "assault
with intent to kill"? One possible answer is a systematic preference for thin codes over thick ones. The idea behind having a
single attempt provision seems to be that to the extent possible,
a criminal code should have fewer and broader provisions
rather than more and narrower ones.
This apparent preference for thin over thick goes unstated
and unsupported, however.181
Unfortunately, neither code
drafters nor commentators have devoted much attention to explaining or analyzing general questions regarding whether,
when, and why a code should seek to be thin or thick, even
though the choice has serious implications with respect to who
(legislatures, prosecutors, judges, or juries) exercises effective
control over the content and development of criminal law.
For example, notwithstanding the thin sensibility its attempt provision suggests, the Model Penal Code does not seem
to follow any systematic meta-rules about how to write or
structure its rules.182 Both its General Part and its Special
Part indicate sympathy for the idea of a thin code, but with
some markedly thick elements, whose relative girth is typically
unexplained. For example, in addition to developing general
181.
Though the Code and its commentary offer no explicit description or justification of its methodology, Gerald Lynch has suggested that the Code's arguably
thin approach derives from its framers' general philosophy of punishment, which
saw rehabilitation rather than retribution as central to criminal justice. According to Lynch, this rehabilitationist focus naturally led to a Code with relatively
few, spare offense definitions, as much of the ultimate task of specifying a particular punishment for a particular offender was expected to depend on later, individualized determinations of the offender's personality, background, and amenability to reform, as opposed to the nature of the offense itself. See Lynch, supra
note 24, at 309-11.
182.
Cf. Green, supra note 20, at 325 ("The Model Penal Code has precious little to say about the organizing principles that underlie the special part. In comparison to the elaborate exegesis on general part concepts such as culpability such
reticence is striking.") (internal footnote omitted).
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provisions to cover attempt and other inchoate crimes (conspiracy and solicitation), the Code's General Part creates a single
provision to address accomplice liability.183 The Code also sets
out default rules for the culpability levels required for criminal
liability, so that individual offenses need not specify the requisite culpability for each particular element.184 Further, in addition to embracing the idea of using a single provision of potentially broad and varied application rather than specific
provisions, the Code sometimes suggests a thin approach to the
writing of those individual provisions. For example, the defense for "mental disease or defect"185 is written in broad language whose content must be, and is meant to be,186 determined ex post in individual cases:
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the
time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect
he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. 187

The provision does not further clarify what it means to "appreciate" the nature of one's conduct, or to possess a "substantial
capacity" to do so, or for that matter, to possess a "mental disease or defect" in the first place.
Yet other areas of the General Part are much thicker,
without any explanation of the basis for making those parts
thick when others are thin. The justification provisions, for example, are both numerous and lengthy.188 The defense-ofproperty provision alone spans several pages of rules, exceptions, and definitions.189 Nothing about the notion of a justification, as opposed to an excuse like the "mental defect" defense,
inherently requires this level of precision. Indeed, if anything,

183.
*SeeMODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 (1985).
184.
See id. § 2.02(4)-(5).
185.
See id. § 4.01.
186.
See id. cmt. 3 at 172 ("It was recognized, of course, that 'substantial' [for
purposes of the crucial inquiry as to "substantial capacity" under § 4,01] is an
open-ended concept, but its quantitative connotation was believed to be sufficiently precise for purposes of practical administration. The law is full of instances in which courts and juries are explicitly authorized to confront an issue of
degree.").
187.
Id. § 4.01(1) (brackets in original).
188.
See generally id. art. 3.
189.
See id. § 3.06.
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justification provisions call out for greater simplicity, as they
define rules of conduct that apply in situations demanding
split-second decisions by everyday citizens.190 Similarly, although the Code seems to simplify the notion of culpability by
defining only four culpable mental states and creating default
rules for their application, the definitions of those mental
states involve a complex and hardly intuitive parsing of offense
elements into three categories-conduct, circumstances, and
results-with each mental state defined by reference to each of
those categories.191 (Strangely, though, the Code takes a thin
approach to dealing with the three categories themselves, offering no definitions of "circumstance" or "result" and only a
broad, and quite unhelpful, definition of "conduct." 192)
The Model Penal Code's Special Part also has both thin
and thick aspects, with no clear policy explaining why it
adopted the chosen mode in a given case. The approach to
theft offenses, for example, embraces a thin vision of offense
definition, consolidating into "a single offense"193 (albeit an offense with eight different flavors194), with "a unitary grading
scheme,"195 the various common-law offenses of "larceny, em-

bezzlement, obtaining by false pretenses, cheating, blackmail,
extortion, fraudulent conversion, receiving stolen property, and
the like."196 Yet the Code also retains various other commonlaw offenses, including thick offenses that redundantly address
190.
See Paul H. Robinson, Michael T. Cahill & Usman Mohammad, The Five
Worst (and Five Best) American Criminal Codes, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 10 (2000)
(hereinafter Robinson et al., Five Worst); see also Paul H. Robinson et al., Making
Criminal Codes Functional:A Code of Conduct and a Code of Adjudication, 86 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 304, 310-12 (1996) [hereinafter Robinson et al., Conduct
and Adjudication].
191.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (1985); see also George P. Fletcher,
Dogmas of the Model Penal Code, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 3, 6 (1998) ("Suffice it to
say that the definitions [of culpability terms in the MPC] are so complicated that
one wonders whether any judge has ever mastered them."). But see Paul H. Robinson, In Defense of the Model Penal Code: A Reply to Professor Fletcher, 2 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 25, 34 (1998) ("My initial reaction is to simply disagree that [the
MPC's culpability] provisions are too complex. My first year, first term students
master them quickly. Why not judges and instructed jurors?").
192.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13(5) (1985) (defining "conduct" as "an action
or omission and its accompanying state of mind, .or, where relevant, a series of
acts and omissions").
193.
Id. § 223.1(1).
194.
See id. § 223.2-.9.
195.
Id. § 223.1 explanatory note at 148 (1980); see also id. § 223.1(2) (setting
out grading of theft).
196.
Id. § 223.1 cmt. 2 at 127.

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

specific combinations of other existing offenses: for example,
arson,197 burglary,198 and robbery.199 If anything, the overall
result suggests a preference for thin codes where possible,
given that the approach to theft reflects an explicit desire to
simplify and consolidate, whereas the retained common-law offenses may have been kept inadvertently or for purely pragmatic reasons, such as the Code drafters thinking that state
legislatures would look askance at a "model" criminal code
without any arson, burglary, or robbery offenses.
To summarize, the Model Penal Code's General Part-its
major achievement200- seems to reflect an effort to tackle individual substantive areas in isolation without any overarching
theory or even guidelines as to how to write criminal law. Its
Special Part is similarly inconsistent on this score, although it
hints at a preference for thin over thick, both in its particular
drafting decisions and in its overall length: all of the Code's offenses combined take up less than 17,000 words, which is even
shorter than the General Part.201 The General Part's relative
length, on the other hand, itself also suggests a desire for the
Code to be thin on the whole, seeking to do as much as possible
with general provisions of broad application instead of precise
197.
See id. § 220.1. Arson is a property-damage offense aggravated to incorporate the jeopardy to human life that attends fires and explosions. Cf. id. § 220.3
(defining "criminal mischief," a general property-damage offense). Yet by recognizing a general endangerment offense (in addition to the existing assault and homicide offenses), the Code has a separate means for addressing that distinct harm or
risk. See id. § 211.2 (defining offense of recklessly endangering another person).
198.
See id. § 221.1. Burglary combines trespass with attempt (the intent to
commit some further crime), with the trespass itself standing in to satisfy the attempt conduct rule. Id.; cf. id. § 5.01 (defining the offense of attempt); id. § 221.2
(defining the offense of trespass). Thus, like reckless endangerment, burglary
deals with a specific inchoate-crime situation: an attempt occurring in the context
of a trespass.
199.
See id. § 222.1. Robbery combines theft and assault. See id. (defining
burglary as injury or threat occurring "in the course of committing a theft"); cf. id.
§ 211.1 (defining assault offense).
200.
See, e.g., Gerard E. Lynch, Revising the Model Penal Code: Keeping It
Real, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 219, 222 (2003) (referring to "the great Wechslerian
achievement of the [Model Penal Code's] general part" and noting that "[t]hose
portions of the general part of the Code that are widely regarded as failures by
academics.., are the exception, rather than the rule"); Lynch, supra note 24, at
298 ("I think it is fair to say... that the continuing influence of the Model Penal
Code today is far greater with respect to the 'general part' of the criminal law
than with regard to the 'special part."').
201.
Judging by my electronic copy, the Special Part of the Model Penal Code is
16,972 words, whereas its General Part is 17,954 words-a count which excludes
articles 6 and 7 of the General Part, dealing with sentencing and corrections.
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specific offenses.
Perhaps this lack of an underlying code-drafting approach
should not be surprising, as the Model Penal Code also arguably lacks any underlying substantive theory of criminal
law202-or rather, might have too many underlying substantive
theories,203 which amount to no consistent theory at all. Even
so, it is especially troubling that the Code, which was after all
designed to serve as a model of code drafting, failed to adopt (or
apparently, even think about adopting) any clear, uniform
methodology.
At least, it's troubling to me. Yet the Code's silence as to
these methodological drafting issues is nearly matched by the
relative paucity of academic work in this area.204 The fundamental distinction between thick and thin basically tracks the
thoroughly familiar rules-versus-standards debate,205 which in
some ways makes it all the more interesting how few scholars
seem to have spent much time trying to apply that debate to
the particular context of criminal law. Frequently, any consideration of how criminal codes are supposed to work, or how best
202.
George P. Fletcher, Criminal Theory in the Twentieth Century, 2
THEORETICAL INQ. L. 265, 285 (2001) ("The Code fails to take a clear stand on the
issues that.., constitute the primary themes of twentieth-century jurisprudence
in criminal law. These include the normative theory of culpability [and] the problem of a comprehensive theory of crime ... ").
203.
See Paul H. Robinson, Hybrid Principles for the Distributionof Criminal
Sanctions, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 19, 21 (1987).
204.
For examples of work that has been done in this area, see Gardner, supra
note 24, at 206, 246-49 (discussing and critiquing British Law Commission's effort toward thin-code-style generalization); Green, supra note 20, at 326-31 (discussing, for several particular types of criminalizable conduct, whether it makes
more sense to reform the law by creating new crimes or expanding existing ones);
Lynch, supra note 24, at 325-48 (offering one of the first thorough efforts to conceptualize the proper allocation of liability issues as between "offense elements"
and "sentencing factors"); Simons, supra note 24, at 306-28 (discussing possible
use of broad versus precise formulations to capture the concept of negligence).
205.
The voluminous literature on rules versus standards includes the following: RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 20.3 (6th ed. 2003);
FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF
RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991); Colin S. Diver, The
Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983); Joseph R.
Grodin, Are Rules Really Better than Standards?, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 569 (1994);
Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557
(1992); Russell B. Korobkin, BehavioralAnalysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23 (2000); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in
Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 580 (1988); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law
as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83
CAL. L. REV. 953 (1995).
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to write them, is tacit-implied in the course of dealing with
some other question.206
Further, the two figures who have spent the most time addressing drafting issues, George Fletcher207 and Paul Robinson,208 seem to reach entirely contrary opinions as to whether
(or more accurately, when) a code should be thin or thick.
Their divergence, though, is not a clearly drawn battle line
about the relative merits of all-thin or all-thick. Rather, each
indicates, without necessarily stating expressly, the belief that
a code should have some thin parts and some thick parts.
Of the two, Robinson has devoted more attention to specific
issues related to code drafting and has developed a more thorough account. His central position as to thin versus thick depends on an initial commitment to a specific principle of criminal-code writing: that the criminal law should distinguish
between two different kinds of rules, which Robinson calls
"rules of conduct" and "rules of adjudication."209 Conduct rules
provide an ex ante statement to the public regarding what behavior is allowed and prohibited, while adjudication rules determine ex post which violations (or violators) of the conduct
rules are to be held criminally liable.210
For example, many academic articles resolve particular criminal law prob206.
lems with "there-ought-to-be-a-law" solutions, proposing some new provision that
will directly address and resolve the problem in question and thereby indicating
an implicit willingness to have, if not an explicit preference for, a thick code that
deals with particular situations by adding particular new offenses. If any legislature were to adopt all of the new offenses criminal law scholars have proposed
over the years, the resulting code would be very thick indeed.
207.
See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS IN CRIMINAL LAW (1998);
FLETCHER, supra note 48; Fletcher, supra note 202; Fletcher, supra note 191;
George P. Fletcher, Truth in Codification, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 745 (1998) (hereinafter Fletcher, Truth).
208.
See, e.g., ROBINSON, supra note 62; Robinson et al., Five Worst, supra note
190; Robinson, supra note 191; Robinson et al., Conduct and Adjudication, supra
note 190; Paul H. Robinson, A FunctionalAnalysis of CriminalLaw, 88 NW. U. L.
REV. 857 (1994).
209.
See generally Robinson et al., Conduct and Adjudication,supra note 190.
See id. at 306-07. The distinction Robinson makes here is similar to one
210.
made earlier by Meir Dan-Cohen. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984)
(distinguishing between criminal law's "conduct rules" addressed to general public
and "decision rules" addressed to officials determining liability). A large part of
Dan-Cohen's purpose in using the distinction, however, was to offer a descriptive
account explaining why some existing criminal rules are structured as they are,
rather than a normative theory of how to write criminal law. See id. at 636-64.
As a normative claim, Dan-Cohen defends what he calls "selective transmission"-"the transmission of different normative messages to officials and to the
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Having made this distinction, Robinson argues that the
conduct rules should be as thin as possible: there should be as
few rules as possible,211 and they should be simply written and
accessible,212 for the sake of providing clear notice to the general populace.213 (Interestingly, Dan Kahan has also suggested
the utility of having relatively broad offenses with simple terms
rather than long, precise definitions, but he takes that position
because he does not want offenses to give completely clear notice.214 Instead, he describes what he calls the "prudence of obgeneral public .. " id. at 635-as a permissible, and perhaps justifiable, tool or
strategy of criminal law. See id. at 667-77. He does not, however, clearly express
a position as to when this tool should be used or what rules should be characterized as conduct rules rather than decision rules. Cf. id. at 667 (noting that the
author's claims "do not add up to an endorsement of selective transmission" but
"only clear the way for evaluating competing substantive moral considerationsan endeavor that I do not undertake"). To the extent Dan-Cohen offers a position
as to whether the expression of the different rules should follow different drafting
methods, his position seems to track Robinson's: conduct rules should be simple
and accessible, but decision rules can be complex and "may be enhanced by the
use of a technical, esoteric terminology that is incomprehensible to the public at
large." Id. at 668.
Dan-Cohen does hint at'the potential of a thin code to achieve the goals of
both conduct rules and decision rules simultaneously. He writes that a code written in "ordinary language" can both guide conduct and define decision rules, if the
language is given a distinct, more technical interpretation when employed at the
decision-rule stage. See id. at 652 ('The ordinary language of a law defining an
offense frames the conduct rule that the law conveys to the general public; the
technical legal definitions give content to the decision rules conveyed by the same
law.").
211.
See Robinson et al., Conduct and Adjudication, supra note 190, at 308-10.
212.
See id. at 310-16.
213.
See id. at 304 ('To effectively communicate to the public, the code must be
easy to read and understand.... Readability, accessibility, simplicity, and clarity
characterize a code that most effectively articulates and announces the criminal
law's rules of conduct.").
See Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of the Law Is an Excuse-But Only for the
214.
Virtuous, 96 MICH. L. REV. 127 (1997). Kahan describes his view:
Because the means by which bad people can invade the rights of others
are infinitely numerous and diverse, any attempt to specify them all by
statute is bound to be incomplete. If the law prohibits altering or counterfeiting vehicle titles, for example, offenders will attempt to achieve
the same effect by inducing state agencies to issue genuine titles containing false information; if it prohibits the interstate transportation of
forged checks, they'll wait until they cross state lines before signing
them; if it bans sawed-off shotguns defined as those with barrels of less
than 17.5 inches, they'll meticulously cut them down to 18. Delegating
power to an agency to close such gaps as quickly as they are discovered is
one device for responding to the law's persistent incompleteness; an-

other, even more common one is prudent obfuscation of the law's outer
periphery. Statutory terms like "fraud," "thing of value," and criminal
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fuscation," suggesting that broad terms are desirable precisely
because their reach is ambiguous, encouraging would-be criminals to err on the side of lawfulness rather than carefully skirting around the fringes of a clear prohibition.215)
Robinson's position as to adjudication rules is somewhat
more complicated: although he again supports making the
rules as general and broad as possible, he acknowledges that
precision and complexity are sometimes warranted.216 Robinson, then, tends to favor a thin code, but with some possible
thickness in the adjudication rules.
Fletcher, on the other hand, takes nearly the opposite
view. He also distinguishes between rules designed to guide
citizens (which he associates with the special part of a criminal
code) and rules designed to guide officials (which he associates
with the general part).217 Precisely because offense definitions
must guide conduct, Fletcher suggests that they demand some
degree of thoroughness and precision.218 Accordingly, Fletcher
has criticized the Model Penal Code for essentially being too
thin as to at least some of its offense definitions, as in its deci"enterprise" are vague enough to "encompass a wide range of criminal
activity, taking many different forms and [attracting] a broad array of
perpetrators operating in many different ways." They remove offenders'
temptation to look for loopholes ex ante by giving courts the flexibility to
adapt the law to innovative forms of crime ex post.
Id. at 138-39 (quoting H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 24849 (1989)). Kahan does not object to complexity in malum prohibitum offenses,
such as violations of the tax code, see id. at 147-48, although he generally suggests the criminal law should avoid such offenses in favor of punishing immoral
conduct, see id. at 153.
See id. at 129 ("[P]rivate knowledge of the law isn't unambiguously good.
215.
The more readily individuals can discover the law's content, the more readily
they'll be able to discern, and exploit, the gaps between what's immoral and
what's illegal. The law must therefore employ strategies to discourage citizens
from gaining knowledge for this purpose.").
See Robinson et al., Conduct and Adjudication, supra note 190, at 321-22
216.
("A code of adjudication can benefit from being made shorter and more streamlined, just as ...a code of conduct could so benefit."); id. at 304-05 ("The adjudicators, on the other hand, can tolerate greater complexity. Clarity and simplicity
are always a virtue, but the judgments required of adjudicators necessarily limit
how simple the adjudication rules can be.").
See Fletcher, Truth, supra note 207, at 753 (citing Dan-Cohen, supra note
217.
210).
218.
See Fletcher, Truth, supra note 207, at 752 ("mhe nearly universal principle of modern criminal justice, nulla poena sine lege (no punishment without
prior legislative warning), requires that a democratically elected legislature specify the contours of liability .... [L]egislatures have the competence and indeed the
duty to lay down the rules defining particular offenses.").
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sion to consolidate all theft offenses; Fletcher prefers the common law's thicker approach.219
Yet Fletcher finds the Model Penal Code too thick with respect to some issues: for example, he thinks the Code's culpability and causation rules (clearly "adjudication rules" under
Robinson's scheme) are too elaborate and complex.220 (He
takes the same position as to the Code's justification provisions,221 thereby agreeing with Robinson, who agrees that they
should be thinner because, in his conceptualization, they define
conduct rules.222) Indeed, as to many complex theoretical issues that Robinson would consider to be matters of adjudication, Fletcher endorses thinness to the point of emaciation, preferring a "deferential" code that does not necessarily offer rules
of its own, even broad ones, but relies instead on outside
sources to resolve some matters:
[A] "deferential" code.., endorses a theoretical structure for
solving problems and may contain some detailed provisions
on specific areas, but it proceeds on the assumption of partnership with both the courts and the theoretical community.
A deferential code, therefore, has a proper sense of its own
limits. To be sure, it avoids trying to solve controverted philosophical issues.223

Fletcher points approvingly to the German Criminal Code as a
deferential code and also cites the U.S. Constitution as a document of the deferential variety.224
Another commentator who has written on these issues in
some detail is Alan Michaels, who has set out a contrast between "descriptive" and "judgmental" models that partly (but
not entirely) parallels the thin-versus-thick account this Article

219.
See Fletcher, supra note 202, at 283-86; Fletcher, supra note 191, at 11
("[T]he Code simply abolishes the historically crafted distinctions between larceny
and embezzlement, which gave the common law offenses sharp edges .... ).
220.
See Fletcher, supra note 191, at 5-8; see also Fletcher, Truth, supra note
207, at 748.
221.
See Fletcher, supra note 191, at 8-10 (criticizing elaborate definition of
"unlawful force"); Fletcher, Truth, supra note 207, at 748-49 (same).
222.
See Robinson et al., Conduct and Adjudication, supra note 190, at 310-12.
223.
Fletcher, Truth, supra note 207, at 750; see also id. at 756 ("That which is
not expressed in deferential codes, and which resides in the theoretical infrastructure, might even be more relevant than that which is actually laid down in black
letter rules.").
224.
See id. at 750-51.
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presents.225 For Michaels, a descriptive rule "defines criminal
liability by reference to facts,"226 whereas a judgmental rule
would "define criminal liability in plainly indeterminate terms
that call for appraisals, assessments, or judgments beyond
findings of fact."227 This distinction maps onto the thick-thin
distinction to the extent the descriptive method would demand
thorough, precise, and numerous (in other words, thick) definitions of criminal rules, while the judgmental method might
more easily apply fewer, broader, and more flexible (in other
words, thin) general concepts such as "reasonableness" or
"wrongfulness."228 The analogy is imperfect, however. For example, Michaels notes that a "criminal code defined entirely by
reference to how a law-abiding person or typical person would
behave could be understood as fully descriptive,"229 though
such a code would be thin under my account. At any rate, for
purposes of the present exploration of the thick-thin debate,
Michaels seems to take no firm position, as he ultimately calls
for a "judgmental descriptivism" approach that would combine
features of the two methods he describes.230 Even so, his formulation is worth mentioning here, as it certainly has some
overlap with this Article's framing of the issues, and the similarities and differences between the two may be illuminating.231

The limited existing literature addressing criminal-code
writing, then, offers contrary positions as to whether and when
it is desirable to follow the thin-code model, the thick-code
model, or some amalgam of the two. This article does not expect, or seek, to categorically resolve the issue, or to provide a
fully developed theory of criminal-code writing. Rather, the
See generally Michaels, supra note 24.
225.
226.
Id. at 62. See also id. at 63 ("If omniscience as to facts would leave virtually no doubt about how the case would be decided, a standard is descriptive. Put
differently, under a descriptive standard, two juries presented with identical cases
should reach the same result.").
227.
Id. at 64.
228.
Michaels also discusses how his distinction compares to the rulesstandards distinction noted above. See id. at 63 n.55; supra note 205 and accompanying text.
Id. at 82 n.154.
229.
See id. at 81-85.
230.
For example, it may be interesting to note that Michaels characterizes the
231.
Model Penal Code as demonstrating a general (though not overwhelming) preference for descriptivism, see id. at 64-65, while he hints that both Robinson and
Fletcher (and Kahan as well) favor judgmental rules, or at least acknowledge
their inevitability, see id. at 66-67.
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present purpose is to call attention to this heretofore largely
neglected problem and offer some preliminary observations.
(In the following section, I also identify some current, and
common, practices that show the dangers of ignoring the issue
altogether by adopting various provisions that fail to follow any
sound or consistent scheme.) Here I offer four general considerations that criminal law drafters should bear in mind.
First, and most centrally, it must be recognized that the
choice between a thin and a thick code is a choice about the allocation of institutional authority.232 A thick code, with many
fixed and precisely defined offenses, represents a relatively
greater assertion of lawmaking prerogative on the legislature's
part. By specifying with detail the contours of particular offenses, and the levels of punishment that attach to each, the
legislature limits the power of judges and juries to shape the
law's content. At the same time, a thick code also arguably
shifts the balance of power among those who implement the
code toward prosecutors and, again, away from judges and juries. More different offenses, even if they are defined fairly
narrowly, may mean more different potential charges, or combinations of charges, as to which a prosecutor may negotiate a
plea. Also, the more precisely defined are the punishments
that attach to each crime, the more accurately the prosecutor
(and the defense) can predict the practical effect of entering
into a plea agreement, making bargains more certain and
therefore more likely. Various commentators on sentencing
guidelines, especially the federal sentencing guidelines, have
observed that although they appear to reflect an exertion of authority by the legislature or sentencing commission, their complexity and precision ultimately operates to give greater power
and discretion to prosecutors.233
A thin code, adopting fewer provisions each of which has a
broader and more flexible reach, has the opposite effect: it
232.
Cf. Lynch, supra note 24, at 343-48 (discussing institutional roles of legislature and judiciary as significant aspect of decisions about allocating liability issues between "offense elements" and "sentencing factors").
233.
See Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in CriminalAdjudication, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1585, 1634 (2005) ("In the context
of federal sentencing, the Sentencing Guidelines clearly-and largely intentionally-restricted judicial authority and shifted power to prosecutors."); William J.
Stuntz, Plea Bargainingand Criminal Law's DisappearingShadow, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 2548, 2559 (2004) ("[R]ule-based sentencing gives prosecutors control-not
just over bargained-for sentences, but over post-trial sentences as well.").
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delegates some lawmaking authority from the legislature to the
judges and juries who decide the exact boundaries of the flexible provisions ex post.234 Those players ultimately determine,
often in the context of fulfilling a "factfinding" role, the meaning of terms such as "reasonable"235 or "substantial risk"236 or
"substantial step."237 I have suggested elsewhere that there
are sound reasons to grant judges and juries such an institutional check on legislative power.238 At the same time, there
are obviously valid concerns, commonly expressed in the sentencing literature,239 about balancing the desirability of caseby-case liability decisions with the concomitant risks of arbitrariness and disparity.
In any event, the central point is that criminal-law drafters must recognize the institutional consequences of adopting
one structure or formulation instead of another.240 Husak's argument about the overinclusiveness of seemingly narrow, conduct-oriented inchoate offenses is apposite here.241 He suggests that thick codes' precise offenses, or at least the inchoate
ones-to the extent they define offenses by reference to conduct
and not to some harm of legitimate concern-will inevitably
reach instances of the conduct that do not actually threaten the
relevant underlying harm. Thinner provisions focusing on
broad categories of harm, rather than narrow instances of con-

234.
Cf. Simons, supra note 24, at 315-17 (discussing how general negligence
standard empowers factfinder to give substantive content to legal standard).
235.
See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (1985) (defining "negligently");
id. § 2.09(1) (describing the affirmative defense of duress); id. § 210.3(1)(b) (defining manslaughter); id. § 250.2 (defining disorderly conduct).
236.
Id. § 2.02(2)(c)-(d) (defining "recklessly" and "negligently"); id. § 2.13 (defining entrapment defense); id. § 3.07 (defining rules for use of deadly force); id. §
3.11(2) (defining "deadly force"); id. § 210.0(3) (defining "serious bodily injury").
237.
Id. § 5.01(1)(c).
238.
See generally Michael T. Cahill, Punishment Decisions at Conviction: Recognizing the Jury as Fault-Finder,2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 91.
239.
See Stephen Breyer, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Revisited, 14 CRIM.
JUST. 28, 35 (Spring 1999) ("Like law itself, the guidelines sought a better balance
between rules that promote uniformity among cases, and practices that focus
upon fairness and equity in the individual case."); Steven L. Chanenson, The Next
Era of Sentencing Reform, 54 EMORY L.J. 377 (2005); Norval Morris, Towards
Principled Sentencing, 37 MD. L. REV. 267, 285 (1977) (advocating presumptive
guidelines as means of enhancing uniformity while maintaining discretion).
240.
See Cahill, supra note 143, at 601-04 (discussing need to consider institutional roles of different players when deciding whether to define a rule as an offense element or a sentencing factor).
241.
See Husak, supra note 21, at 605-15; see also supra note 172 and accompanying text.
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duct, may avoid such overbreadth-but then again, they also
may not. One problem is that their scope is unpredictable ex
ante precisely because they are ambiguous about the conduct
they prohibit. Their effective reach will be determined after
the fact by law enforcement, prosecutors, and juries. Such offenses might not be overbroad in the sense of applying to identifiable cases that do not deserve punishment. Even so, they
may still overdeter if people refrain from engaging in conduct
that is actually allowed but whose status is unclear ex ante, or
may create problems with discretionary enforcement, as Husak
notes.242 But Husak's analysis suggests that the inchoate provisions of a thick code may also confer great discretion on the
police, on whom we must rely to rein in the offenses' tendencies
toward overbreadth.
Second, as the Robinson and Fletcher positions make clear,
it is entirely possible that a code should be thick for some purposes and thin for others. Because of the disparity concerns
just noted, for example, criminal sentencing rules have become
extremely thick in the last few decades. This trend may represent an overreaction against an aspect of criminal law that had
been thin to the point of skeletal emaciation, but also may reflect a particular concern for precision in the rules fixing the
amount of liability, as opposed to the rules determining
whether liability exists. On the other hand, the distinction between sentencing issues and, say, what Robinson would characterize as "conduct rules" can be fairly slippery. The categorization of a particular factor may depend in part on an overt
legislative decision about how to characterize it, given the procedural and other consequences following from the choice.243
Perhaps sentencing rules should be thinner, but offense definitions should simultaneously be made thicker. This is not to
say, however, that the choice between thick and thin is meaningless, or that it is acceptable for a code to be thick, thin, or
both in an indiscriminate and unprincipled way. The next section discusses the dangers of inattention to the issue.
Third, although it is easy to characterize thick codes as
rigid and unwavering while thin codes are more elastic and
adaptable, the thin approach carries its own risks of a more
242.
See Husak, supra note 21, at 623 ("Law enforcement might become too
discretionary in the absence of a statute that unambiguously proscribes such conduct as heroin possession.").
243.
See Cahill, supra note 143, at 602-04.
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pervasive conceptual ossification of our approach to criminal
law. Over time, broad legal constructs that seek to map onto
entire general categories of issues may become confused with
the underlying conceptual categories themselves, or reified as if
they represent some objectively true, immutable fact. That is
to say, there is no such thing, out in the world, as an "attempt;"
the idea of attempt is merely a legal formulation designed to
deal with a set of situations that seem meaningfully similar.
Yet criminal law theorists now tend to view issues of inchoate
liability through the prism of "attempt" simply because that is
how the law has chosen to formulate the issue.
Finally, there may be some ways to structure criminal law
that go beyond, or harmonize, the thin-thick dichotomy. For
example, one solution Paul Robinson and I have proposed in
the past, and which the Model Penal Code itself indirectly suggests, is to write a thin code, but supplement that code with official commentary that has the effect of fleshing out its
rules.244 The commentary might offer clear and precise illustrations of how the code should apply to predictable and recurring situations, while the code itself would retain the flexibility
to accommodate unforeseen cases.
In any event, as the next section discusses, many modern
codes are both thin and thick with respect to the same types of
rules, creating multiple overlapping provisions to address the
same conduct or issue, with no clear reason for doing so. While
it may make some sense to be thin for some purposes and thick
for others, it is dangerous to pile thickness onto a thin frame.
D. The Dangers of Mixing Thick and Thin
In the ARH case, the Model Penal Code adopted a thick solution out of step with its usual thin preferences. If that were
the end of the matter, perhaps this would be nothing more than
an interesting legal footnote. But many legislatures have replicated or exacerbated the problem by enacting codes that generally follow the thin model, but then supplementing those
codes with numerous new, specific offenses.245 The later provi-

sions often duplicate and overlap with provisions in both the
general part (such as the complicity, conspiracy, and attempt
244.
See Robinson & Cahill, supra note 175, at 654-55.
245.
See id. at 635-36 (noting large number of additions to criminal codes after
enactment, and observing that rate of amendment is accelerating).
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provisions) and the special part (such as broad theft offenses or
assault offenses). One example of this practice is the proliferation of specific endangerment offenses supplementing the more
general RE offense, as discussed in Part II.B.
Those endangerment offenses, coupled with the preexisting attempt provision, raise issues of applying inchoate liability to offenses that are themselves inchoate. If a code has a
general attempt rule and also defines numerous inchoate offenses to which the attempt rule might apply, the basis of
criminal liability begins to slide further and further from the
actual harms the criminal law seeks to address. Unfortunately, the modern trend is to keep a general attempt provision--often a provision with broad terms, such as demanding
only a "substantial step" toward an offense for attempt liability
to apply-yet also to add more and more offenses, many of
which cover inchoate conduct.246
Even without the "double-inchoate" problem, layering specific offenses over other, more general offenses leads to redundancies and inconsistencies in the law. As I have discussed
elsewhere, these duplications are neither unimportant nor
harmless, but cause several significant problems.247 First,
overstuffed criminal codes make it more difficult for the average citizen to understand what the criminal code commands.
Rather than promoting the principle of notice, today's criminal
law creates an impregnable network of prohibitions that no one
but a criminal law expert could decipher.
The notice problem is further exacerbated by the increasing level of criminalization. As William Stuntz has put it, we
are moving "ever closer to a world in which the law on the
books makes everyone a felon."248 Even attorneys, police officers, and other law enforcement officials cannot grasp all of the
prohibitions of modern criminal law. The increasing complexity, inconsistency, and unfamiliarity of most criminal codes also
246.
See ASHWORTH, supra note 37, at 420-21 (noting several offenses "defined
in the inchoate mode" and noting that "[t]here is little evidence that these extensions of the criminal law are carefully monitored, or that the implications of applying the inchoate offenses [like attempt] to crimes defined in the inchoate mode
have ever been systematically considered").
The balance of this section's discussion draws on Robinson & Cahill, supra
247.
note 175, at 638-40. For a provocative recent critique of some of these positions,
see Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV. __
(forthcoming 2007).
William Stuntz, The PathologicalPolitics of CriminalLaw, 100 MICH. L.
248.
REV. 505, 511 (2001).
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increase the likelihood of costly mistakes by both lawyers and
trial judges and of disparate treatment. Any given official can
only be expected to become familiar with a digestible set of
"pet" offenses-but different officials may have different pet
offenses, or differing levels of familiarity with the intricacies of
the law, making arbitrary treatment more likely.
This ties in to a second problem, which is that the criminalization trend effectively destroys the rule of law. The creation of new statutory offenses may seem like an acceptable and
even desirable exercise of legislative prerogative, fully in keeping with the core principles of legality that are central to
criminal law. But the modern expansion of criminalization also
reflects a shift of practical authority away from the legislature
to prosecutors and police, who now have broad discretion over
who gets punished and how much they are punished. As Douglas Husak has noted, the combination of that broad discretion
with the modern trend toward "all-encompassing offenses ... is
destructive of the rule of law."249 Arrest, punishment, and the
level of punishment are now determined as much by the ad hoc
decision-making of individual law enforcement officials as by
the legal rules.250
Third, overlapping offenses introduce considerable difficulties into the interpretation and implementation of a statutory
scheme because the relationship between multiple overlapping
offenses is often unclear. Specific offenses that duplicate a preexisting general offense call into question the scope of the general offense. Even if offenses do not contradict each other, efforts to use all available offenses at once to obtain multiple
punishments only introduce confusion.251
249.
Douglas Husak, Is the Criminal Law Important?, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
261, 269 (2003).
250.
See William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargainingand CriminalLaw's Disappearing
Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548 (2004).
251.
For example, current Illinois law limits the total aggregate sentence for
all consecutive sentences committed as part of a single course of conduct to the
sum of the maximum terms for the two most serious offenses. See 730 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/5-8-4(c)(2) (West 2002). In a recent case interpreting this rule, the Illinois
Supreme Court held that the consecutive-sentence provision effectively trumped a
separate statutory sentence aggravation, so that the maximum allowed sentence
for the defendant's five offenses of conviction was less than-in fact, less than half
of-the sentence for which he would have been eligible had he committed only one
of the offenses. See People v. Pullen, 733 N.E.2d 1235, 1238-39 (Ill. 2000).
The defendant, Dennis Pullen, pleaded guilty to five counts of burglary, which
is typically a Class 2 felony. Id. at 1236. Normally, Pullen's various prior convictions would have led to sentencing him as a Class X offender under Illinois law.
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Finally, as noted above, multiple overlapping offenses generate inconsistent punishment levels252 or run the risk of improper multiple liability.253 Perhaps a purely thick code could
create a long list of specific offenses and identify particular levels of punishment for each. But then such a code would have to
make those offenses mutually exclusive so that improper multiple liability would not be possible: if an act were arson, it
would only be arson, and not property damage or RE also.
On the other hand, a very thin code might define only a
small handful of offenses, taking the view that arson is unnecessary if property damage and RE already exist to address the
types of harm arson would also cover. In that case, though, the
offenses would need to be "stackable," so that conduct (like arson) creating or threatening multiple harms would lead to liability for multiple offenses, each of which would contribute in
some way to the offender's total punishment. Either scheme
(no multiple liability, or multiple liability whenever possible)
might be feasible for a completely thick or thin code. As a code
mixes thick and thin, though, it becomes necessary to confront
the tricky task of defining principles for when multiple liability
is allowed and when not, or else to acknowledge the likelihood
of multiple liability being imposed (or at least threatened in
plea negotiations) in inappropriate cases.

Id.; see 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5-3(c)(8) (West 2002) (requiring that defendant
convicted of Class 1 or 2 felony, who has committed two past offenses of Class 2 or
higher, "shall be sentenced as a Class X offender"). If Pullen had pleaded guilty to
a single count of burglary, he would received a sentence of at least 6 to 30 years,
and would have been eligible for an "extended term" sentence of 30 to 60 years.
See id. 515-5-3.2(b)(1) (allowing extended term based on recidivism); id. 5/5-82(a)(2) (allowing extended-term sentence of 30 to 60 years for Class X felony).
Because he was convicted of multiple counts, however, the court had to apply
Illinois' consecutive-sentence provision. Pullen, 733 N.E.2d at 1237; see also 730
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-8-4(c)(2) (West 2002). The court interpreted that provision to
require that the defendant could receive, at most, twice the extended-term sentence for the underlying, unaggravated Class 2 felony of burglary. Pullen, 733
N.E.2d at 1239-40. A Class 2 felony carries an extended-term sentence of 7 to 14
years, see 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-8-2(a)(4) (West 2002), so the maximum sentence for Pullen would be 14 to 28 years, instead of the 30 to 60 years available if
the consecutive-sentence rules has not come into play. See Pullen, 733 N.E.2d at
1240 ('We recognize that it may seem anomalous for defendant to have been eligible for a longer sentence if sentenced 'as a Class X offender' for a single crime
than if he were subject to consecutive sentences for multiple crimes ....However,
we are not at liberty to rewrite the statute in the guise of interpreting it.").
See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
252.
253.
See supra notes 176-80 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION

Most American criminal codes started out fairly thin and
have grown increasingly thick. Perhaps there is a reason to
prefer the added bulk: whereas a thin code must be nimble and
move around a lot, sometimes jerkily, to cover the necessary
ground, a thick code can take up the same space just sitting
there.
Such is the seeming reaction of law to the notion of attempted reckless homicide: for a code to remain thin while recognizing such an offense, it would need to contort itself in odd
ways, causing a result somehow more problematic than any
possible cost from the seemingly modest bit of added thickness
a reckless endangerment offense would add. As it turns out,
though, no such contortions would be necessary: wrapping an
attempt provision around reckless homicide is entirely possible
-indeed, some codes already do it, although most of those don't
realize it-and despite the claims of critics, doing so does not
demand any unattractive reshaping of the law or entail any
significant harm. Further, and more importantly, the urge to
splurge in adopting new crimes, once indulged, proves difficult
to contain, resulting in the worst combination of all: a thick
body of law whose heft does not enhance, but only duplicates
and complicates, an underlying thin frame.

